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Commercial banks, through their provisioning, recognize that
they expect less than full payment on their developing country
debt.  Provisioning reduces the willingness of banks to provide
new  funds,  increasing  the  importance  of  debt-reduction
schemes. Banks would like the multilateral agencies to take the
lead. One answer, now or in the future, may be an international
bankruptcy court.
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Debt  and Intematlonal  Finance
With Mexico's announcement in 1982 that it  toward debt relief than toward the injection of
could not meet its debt obligation, the debt crisis  new money to debtor nations. The altemative to
- which arose from the spate of lending that  debt relief may be general default - given the
began with the 1973 oil hike - became public.  deteriorating economies in debtor countries, the
In 1985, Peru limited payment on its debt  gloomy global outlook, and the diminished
obligations. The 1985 Baker Plan - designed  expectation of new monies.
to lend more to heavily indebted countries in
rettrn  for structural adjustment within them - Provisioning may be seen as the commercial
had lilie  impact on financial flows.  In 1987,  banks' first step toward extricating themselves
Brazil suspended interest rate payments on part  from a certain kind of investment in developing
of its debt.  countries. A general feeling in the banking
community is that the multilateral agencies must
Against this background, Citicorp decided in  take a stronger role than they have in resolving
May 1987 to add $3 billion to its loan loss  the debt problem - not that they lend vast sums
reserves - and many other money center banks,  of money but that they assume stewardship of
in the United States and abroad, followed suit.  the debt crisis, adopting a clearly thought out
Such provisioning --  putting aside reserves in  strategy, and making more constructive use of
low-earning but risk*  free assets to cover the  conditionality.
possibility of default on loans - reduces both
risk exposure and short-term eamings.  One proposed instrument for this is an
intemational bankruptcy court (the International
No matter what the banks say otherwise, one  Debt Restructuring Agency).  It would bring
implication of provisioning is that the banks  together creditors, the debtor country, and the
expect less than full repayment of these debts.  multilateral agencies to work out an appropriate
Banks with large provisions will lean more  debt relief agreement, conditional on adjustment
measures undertaken by the debtor country.
This paper is a product of the Debt and Intemational Finance Division, Intema-
tional Economics Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Ida Holloman-Wil-
liams, room S7-035, extension 33729.
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Graham Bird is a Professor  of Economics at the University of Surrey.COMMERCIAL  BANK  PROVISIODING  AGAINST  CLAIMS  ON DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Graham  Bird
SU__ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There  is  considerable confusion over  what  commercial bank
provisioning  is  and  over  the  extent  to  which  it  has  been  practised.  Section  I
of this  paper  provides  some  clarification  of these  issues,  although  the  data
are far from comprehensive. The important  technical  distinction  between
provisioning  and writing  down is explained,  although,  by its very nature,
provisioning  must suggest  some presumption  that writing  down will to some
extent  become  necessary. The  data reveal  that  cross-sectionally  there  have
been significant  differences  in  the  practices  as regards  provisioning  against
their  claims on  developing  countries by  banks  in  different creditor
countries. Moreover,  through  time  there  have been  changes  in the  extent  to
which banks  have provisioned. There  was a notorious  surge  in provisioning
during  the  summer  of IP87  led  by  Citibank's  decision  in  May  to  add  to  its  loan
loss reserves.  Section I  also catalogs  the extent to which national
en%:ronments  are  provisioning-friendly.
Section  II of the report  goes  on to examine  in  more  detail  some  of
the  factors  which  influence  banks'  provisioning  decisions.  In  part  these  help
to explain both the cross-sectional  and time series  differences  mentioned
above.  A distinction  is drawn  between  secular  changes  which  contributed  to
the  perceived  need for  greater  provisions,  and  more proximate  bank specific
factors. The  deteriorating  economic  performance  and  prospects  of many  debtor
nationals  created  an environment  in which  provisioning  became  increasingly
appropriate. Yet, it was the  reflection  of this  in the  market  valuation  of- 2  -
the banks which  put direct  pressure  on them  to set aside  larger  reserves.
Moreover,  banks  seemed  anxious  to  create  greater  flexibility  for  manoeuvre  in
their  balance  sheets  and provisioning  had the  effect  of doing  this.  At the
same time there  is considerable  doubt  as to whether  most banks  would  have
added to their provisions  had it not been for the Citibank  move.  This
reflects  the element  of competition  involved  in the provisioning  episode.
Some  of the  factors  relevant  to  explaining  cross-sectional  differences  across
countries,  such  as  the  tax  and  regulatory  environment,  do  not  seem  to  have  had
an important  influence  on changes  in provisions  through  time,  a'though  there
may  be  scope  for  using  the  tax  system  to  encourage  banks  to  offer  debtors  some
greater  degree  of relief.
Section  III explores  the ramifications  of provisioning  for banks,
debtor  countries,  and  the  official  sector. Again  these  do  not  appear  to  be of
fundamental  importance  in terms  of resolving  the  international  debt problem.
The  banks  are  provided  with  greater  opportunity  to pursue  debt  sales  and  debt
equity  swaps,  but  provisioning  has little  direct  effect  on debtor  countries.
Of  course  any  policy  change  alters  the  negotiating  environment,  but  even  here
there  is  considerable  ambiguity  about  what  effects  extra  bank  provisioning  has
and  some  confusion  about  whose  bargaining  position  is strengthened.  There  is
more  consensus  that,  for  various  reasons,  provisioning  will  reduce  the  size  of
future bank  loans to  developing  countries.  This may  be  of  limited
significance  inasmuch  as the  loans  were likely  to be small  in any  case,  but,
if  not replaced  from  other  sources,  such  a reduction  could  increase  pressures
on  debtor countries  to default on their debt.  Through this prospect,
provisioning  puts pressure  on the  official  sector  to do more in helping  to
resolve  the  international  debt  problem.Section  IV examines  various  ways in which an international  debt
strategy,  under the auspieces  of the multilateral  agencies,  might evolve
following  the provisioning  era.  It is argued  that  many  of the  issues  raised
by provisioning  could  be addressed  by establishing  an initiative  to bring
together  all the parties  involved  and to agree  on a structured  program  of
selective  debt  relief  combined  with  enhanced  policy  conditionality.  1'
The overall  conclusion  is therefore  that,  while  provisioning  hardly
represents  a solution  to the  debt problem  on its  own, it may represent  one
step  on the  road  towards  such  a solution.  If,  however,  the  impetus  for  reform
which  may  have  been  given  by the  banks'  actions  is  not  followed  through  there
is a risk that  provisioning  may actually  worsen  the  debt  problem  by raising
the  likelihood  of  debtor  default.
ITWRODUCTION
Although  this  report  focuses  on "provisioning"  by commercial  banks
against their loans  in developing  countries,  it is important  to put this
development  into the general  perspective  of the  evolving  international  debt
problem.
As is well cataloged  in the literature,  the  seeds  of this problem
were, in many ways, sown following  the first  major  hike in oil prices  in
1973.  Developing  countries  facing  large  balances  of payments  deficits  were
attracted  to  the  alternative  of financing  which  enabled  them  to  adopt  a slower
speed  of adjustment  than  would  otherwise  have  been  necessary.  Even  some  oil-
1. The significance  of conditionality  should  be underlined. Resolution  of
the  global  debt problem  depends  crucially  on the  pursuit  of appropriate
policies  in  the  debtor  countries  themselves.- 4  -
rich countries  were encouraged  to borrow  on the strength  of their oil
resources.  The  required  financing  was,  in  large  measure,  provided  through  the
intermediation  of the private  international  banks  with the  official  sector
adopting  a relatively  muted  role.  2/
By 1982,  however,  there  were  very visible  signs  that  this  spate  of
lending  had problems  associated  with it.  Mexico  announced  that it  would  be
unable  to  meet its  debt  obligations  and  the  debt  "crisis"  became  a matter  of
wide public  debate  and concern.  A  series  of potential  reforms  were put
forward  by various  commentators,  but,  in  practical  terms,  the  crisis  has  been
largely  managed  by a  combination  of adjustment  in the debtor countries,
-esched 4uling,  and new loans implicitly  capitalizing  a portion  of scheduled
interest  payments.
Initially,  there  were some indications  that this policy  approach,
applied  in  a flexible  fashion,  would  prove  adequate  and  there  were  even  press
reports  in late 1984 and early 1985 suggesting  that the crisis  was over.
However,  such  optimism  was short-lived  and,  in  retrospect,  depended  crucially
on the ability  oI  the  United  States  to sustain  the  rapid  economic  growth  it
had achieved  during  1984.  By the  mid-1980s  there  were  many signs  that  the
gi 2al  debt problem  was in fact  getting  worse  rather  than  better,  and some
sig  .8  that the debtor countries  might begin to adopt a  somewhat  more
aggressive  posture  in their  negotiations  with  creditors. Ir.  July 1985,  for
example,  Peru's  government  announced  that  it  would  limit  its  payments  of
2.  The official  sector  did respond  in some ways.  For example,  the IMF
established  an Oil  Facility  to assist those countries particularly
adversely  affected  by the  oil  price  rise.-5-
principal  and interest  to a maximum  of 10 percent  of the country's  export
earnings.
Towards  the  end  of 1985  the  Unitsd  States  endeavored  to  seizersome  of
the  initiative  by putting  forward  a set  of  proposals,  the  Baker  Plan,  designed
to encourage  more lending  to heavily  indebted  developing  countries  in return
for  structural  adjustment  within  them.  In practice  the  Plan  had  very little
discernible  impact  on the quantity  of financial  flows.  With much of 1986
being  dominated  by eventually  successful  attempts  by  creditors  to  negotiate  an
acceptable  package  of policies  with Mexico,  under  the  auspices  of the IMF,
February  1987 saw Brazil  suspending  interest  rate payments  on part of its
international  debt.
It was against  this background  that Citicorp  decided to add $3
billion  to  its  loan  loss  reserves  in  May  1987,  a  move  which  was  fairly  quickly
matched by other money center banks in the United States and by many
International  banks  elsewhere.
The purpose  of this report  is to examine  both statistically  and
analytically  various  aspects  of comercial bank  provisioning.  The report  is
divided  into  four  principal  parts. The  first  examines  the  nature  and extent
of provisioning,  drawing  out  the  differences  that  exist  between  countries  and
explaining  the implications  of provisioning  for banks'  balance  sheets. The
second  looks  at the various  factors  affecting  the decision  to provision  and
tries  to  differentiate  between  those  of  a long  term  and  secular  type  and  those
of  more  short term and  proximate  relevance.  The  third examines the
implications  of provisioning  for  both  creditors  and  debtors  and  for  the  global
debt situation  in general.  The fourth  and final  section  wanders  a little
beyond  the  central  question  of  provisioning  to  review  more  broadly  certain-6-
options  which  might  be considered  in attempting  to alleviate  the  problem  of
global  debt.  31
I.  FACTUAL  AND  STATISTICAL  BACKCROUND
Although  the  phrases  are  sometimes  used interchangeably  there  is  an
important  distinction  between  writing  off, writing  down and provisioning
against loans.  In the case of writing  off or writing  down a  loan,  the
creditor  institution  reduces  the book value  of the.  ssset in its balance
Pheets,  to a level  which  reflects  its  net  present  value  nore  accurately.  In
general,  banks  have  been  reluctant  to  write  down  loans  and  have  only  done  this
against  claims  on  a fairly  narrow  range  of countries. Instead  what  they  have
done  is to "provision"  against  certain  loans  by putting  aside  reserves  in  low
earning  but  risk  free  assets  in  order  to  cover  the  possibility  that  repayments
of principal  or payments  of interest  might  not  be made.  Extra  provisioning
therefore  is  the  same  thing  as  building  up  loan  loss  reserves.
These  reserves  may  be "general"  or "specific".  The  former  represent
the normal business  practice  of allowing  for the fact that there is a
statistical  probability  that a certain  proportion  of loans  will encounter
problems.  Specific  provisions  are, however,  set  aside  against  loans  to a
particular  country  or group of countries  where a specific  risk has been
identified.  41  Apart  from  anything  else,  the  distinction  between  general  and
specific  provisions  is significant  since tax deductions  are not allowed
3.  For a broader  review  of the  evolving  International  debt  crisis  see,  for
example,  Craham  Bird,  World  Finance  and  Adjustment;  An  Agenda  for  Reform,
Macmillan,  London,  1985,  Chapter  8.
4.  Most  provisioning  that  has  been  made  by  commercial  banks  has  publicly  been
presented  as being  against  a group  of (say)  35 countries.  The banks
themselves,  however,  arrive at  the overall provision  by aggregating
notional  provisions  against  individual  countries.against  general  provisions  (in  the  United  States  this  has  only  been  the  case
since  1986  when  Federal  Tax  Law  was  changed),  whereas  creditors  may  be  able  to
negotiate  some  tax  reductions  again&t  specific  provisions.
Because the  setting  aside of  reterves  reduces the provisioning
institution's  earnings,  it has an adverse  effect  on profits.  While the
creditors'  extent  of risk  exposure  is  reduced  by  provisioning,  a price  has  to
be  paid  in  terms  of reduced  short  term  earnings.  5/
In  attempting  to provide some form of  factual  and  statistical
background  against which the causes  and effects  of provisioning  may  be
assessed in  subsequent sectior.sp  this  section examines the  following
questions. First,  to what  extent  has  provisioning  or reserving  by the  banks
occurred,  and does it vary between  banks  across  countries  and over time?
Second,  do tax  and  regulatory  environments  differ  in  terms  of their  treatment
of provisioning  and  third,  to what  extent  does  the  bank  provisioning  that  has
occurred  reflect  the discount  on developing  country  debt observed  in the
secondary  market,  and  has  provisioning  been  adequate?
A  major difficulty  in providing  comprehensive  answers to these
questions  is the lack of data concerning  provisioning  against  developing
country  loans, the confidentiality  with which much of the data that are
available  are  treated,  and  the  generdl  degree  of opaqueness  in some  countries
relating  to issues  such  as the  position  and  attitudes  of the  regulators  and
the  tax  authorities.
5.  Provisioning  decisions  therefore  reflect  the  conventional  choice  that  has
to  be  made  between  return  and  risk.Most  of  the  data  in  this  report  are  drawn  from  the  International  Bank
Credit Analysis Croup (IBCA) sources,  although  even here, the data  is
constrained  by the  factors  just  listed.  6/
Table 1 shows  the  exposure  of the  banks,  by country  of origin,  to
individual  Latin  American  states.  Clearly  the  degree  of exposure  in these
highly indebted  cotntries  is likely  to influence  the banks'  attitudes  to
provisioning.  Table 1 reveals the dominant  position  of the US  banks.
Exposures  are,  however,  also  significant  in the  cases  of the  UK an,  - anese
banks,  becoming  less  significant  in the  case  of banks  in France,  Germany  and
Canada,  and much less significant  in the case  of those  in Switzerland  and
Italy.  (Exposure  relative  to capital  would  be a better  measure  but cross-
country  comparisons  of bank  capital  are  difficult.)  Given  that  the  costs  of
provisioning  will  be positively  related  to  the  extent  of  exposure,  it  might  be
anticipated  that  banks  in the  countries  where  exposure  is  less  would  tend  to
favor  rather  higher  percentage  provisions  (related  to the values  of their
loans  to individual  or groups  of developing  countries)  than  would  banks  in
countries  where  exposure  is greater. In the latter  group  of countries  the
absolute  costs  of provisioning  will  be higher. This,  in turn,  suggests  that
the  extent  of provisioning  will  be more  affected  by the  ability  of the  banks
to make such  provisions,  than  by an unbiased  assessment  of  risk.  However  it
needs  to be noted  that U.S. Banks  also hold a larger  overall  portfolio  of
loans,  with the result that their relative  exposure  may not be high by
international  standards.  For  examp±e,  it is  reported  that  at the  end  of 1986
6.  The  report,  however,  draws  not  only  on published  statistics  but  also  on a
rdnge  of interviews  conducted  with  bankers  and  officials  in London,  New
York  and  Washington.-9-
the  portfolio  of U.S. Commercial  Banks  was twelve  times  as large  as that  of
Canadian  banks,  but  not  their  leans  to  Latin  American  countries  were  only  five
times  larger.
even so, my idea of a negative  relationship  between  exposure  and
percentage  provisions  appears  to be borne  out by the data in Table  2 which
shows the percentage  reserves  held against  developing  country  loans in a
number  of countries  at the  end  of 1986. However,  the  table  also  reveals  that
there  has been significant  differences  between  banks  even within  the same
country. Furthermore,  although  many  banks  do not  make  available  infotmation
concerning  their  reserving  against  individual  countries,  what  information  is
available  suggests  that  there  may  be  quite  wide  divergences.  Thus,  for  a bank
with an overall  provision  of (say)  25 percent,  the  reserve  against  one  Latin
American  country  may  be  as low  as 5  percent.  while  that  against  another  may  be
as  high  as  35  percent.  7/
To some extent  the different  pattern  of behavior  with regard  to
provisioning  may reflect  the traditionally  different  attitudes  of bankers
throughout  the world to the optimum  point  on any return/risk  trade off.
Germany  bankers  are, for example,  not infrequentiy  critical  of the rapid
expansion  of loans to developing  countries  by US banks during the 1970s
precisely  because  of  the  risks  it  involved,  and  their  more  prudent  approach  to
lending  (not  revealed,  of course,  in German  bank  lending  to  Eastern  Europe  in
the  1970s).
Beyond this, however, is  the  question of  how  important are
7. These figures  are derived  from  the  practices  of Dutch  banks  in 1986  as
reported  to IBCA  Banking  Analysis.- 10  -
differences  in  the  tax  and regulatory  environment  in  explaining  international
differences  in provisioning.  Would a  US  bank faced with the  German
environment  have  provisioned  more,  and  would  a Germany  bank  faced  with  the  US
environment  have  provisioned  less?
In order  to offer  some  answers  to this  question  we need  to identify
what differences  there are in the regulatory  and tax environments  across
countries.
In  the  US  mhost  large  banks  are  regulated  by the  Federal  Reserve  Board
(FED) or the Office  of the Comptroller  of the Currency.  Because  of its
insurance  role the Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  also has a
hand in determining  provisioning  regulations,  as well as rules  relating  to
capital  adequacy. The regulators'  attitudes  to provisioning  are  coordinated
through  the Inter-Agency  Country  Exposure  Review  Committee  (ICERC).  It is
this  agency  which  sets  standards  for  how  banks  should  treat  loans  to  countries
that  are  not  servicing  their  debts.
Under  existing  regulations  US banks  must  hold reserves  equal  to at
least  5.5  percent  of  total  assets  and  capital  equal  to  at least  6.0  percent  of
total assets.  Beyond establishing  these ratios there are no  further
regulations  relating  to general provisions.  The regulatory  bodies may,
however, require banks to  make  specific  provisions  against individual
countries  in  the  form  of  allocated  transfer  risk  reserves  (ATRR). In  the- 11  -
first  year  following  such  a requirement  the  ATRR  has  to  cover  a minimum  of 10
percent  of the  loans,  rising  by 15  percent  in  subsequent  years. Such  reserves
are  tax  deductible  but  they  have  been  rarely  used  in  the  past.  8/
While US banks can no  longer claim any proportion  of  general
provisions  against  tax,  such  provisions  do  count  as part  of the  banks'  capital
base  and  therefore  do  not  damage  the  banks'  position  as far  as the  regulations
relating  to capital  adequacy  are concerned. Furthermore,  US banks  can  claim
tax  allowance  for  actual  "write  downs"  against  provisions.  More  broadly,  it
is through  this tax  mechanism  that  regulators  may, in principle,  encourage
banks  to  offer  some  form  of  debt  relief  to  debtor  countries.  9/
In Germany  the tax  laws  are particularly  favorable  to provisioning
and permit  reserves  to be deducted  from taxable  profits. Furthermore,  the
financial  authorities  have  actively  encouraged  German  banks  to be prudent  in
the  valuation  of  their  claims  of  developing  countries.  French  regulations  are
slightly  less  liberal  in  as  much  as provisions  against  sovereign  debt  are  only
tax deductible  if the  debtor  country  concerned  is on a list  of 41 countries
compiled  by the  country's  Banking  Commission.  For  such  countries,  provisions
8.  The ICERC may classify  problem  sovereign  debts  as sub-standard,  value
impaired  or a loss.  To be classified  as value-impaired  a debtor  must
fulfill  more than  one  of four  conditions:  that  it  has  not  paid  interest
for six months; that it is failing  to comply  with an IMF supported
program;  that  it  has  failed  to  meet  its  rescheduling  terms  for  a year;  and
that  there  is little  prospect  for  an orderly  restoration  of  debt  service
in  the  near  future.
9.  Of  course a  write-down  by a  bank does not alleviate  the debtors'
contractual  obligations,  but,  in  principle,  the  tax  system  offers  one  way
in which the burden  of adjustment  to the debt problem  could  be shared
between  the  banks  and  the  governments  of creditor  countries.  Greater  tax
allowances  could  for  instance  be  made  for  banks  which  translated  a  write-
down  into  a reduction  in  the  debt  service  payments  of the  debtor  country.
.- 12  -
are  deductible  from  taxable  profits  up to  100  percent  of the  face  value  of  the
loan.
By contrast,  in Japan,  banks  may not  deduct  more than  20 percent  of
their  provisions  from  taxable  profits. Moreover,  regulations  permit  them  to
hold  reserves  against  no more  than  5 percent  of  their  total  loans. (Recently
these  regulations  have  been  liberalized  slightly.)
In the UK, regulators  have encouraged  the banks to consider  the
adequacy  of their  provisions  with  respect  to their  developing  country  loans
without  setting  minimum  or maximum  values. Specific  provisions  do not  count
as capital  and general  provisions  are  not  tax  deductible.  The  tax  status  of
specific  provisions  is  unclear. There  is  certainly  no  presumption  that  these
may be automatically  offset  against  tax.  Much  would seem  to depend  on the
particular  negotiations  between  an individual  bank and the tax district
handling  its  affairs.  10/
The above review  does seem to imply  that the tax and regulatory
environment  has  been  more  supportive  of provisioning  in countries  where  banks
have  conventionally  held  somewhat  higher  provisions.  But  it  may be  unwise  to
draw  the  conclusion  that  there  is  necessarily  a strong  causal  link. Prior  to
the change in Federal  Tax Law in 1986,  for example,  US regulations  were
perhaps  rather  more liberal  than in the UK and yet US banks  did not hold
proportionately  higher  reserves. In this  case  the  reluctance  of US banks  to
0
10.  IBCA reports  the following  ranges  of provisioning  (in  percent  of loans)
permitted  to UK  banks  by  the  Inland  Revenue: Argentina,  5-10;  Brazil,  5-
10; Bolivia,  75; Chile,  5; Cuba,  5-25;  Guyana,  25-30;  Jamaica,  10-25;
Liberia,  25-30;  Mexico,  5-10;  Nicaragua,  10-50;  Nigeria,  10;  North  Korea,
80;  Peru,  15-30;  Philippines,  10;  Poland,  25-30;  Sudan,  30;  Yugoslavia,  5-
10;  Zaire,  40-50;  and  Zambia,  30.- 13  -
add  to  their  reserves  may  have  reflected  their  high  absolute  exposure  reported
in  Table  1,  but it  does  serve  to show  that  the  tax  and  regulatory  environment
may  not  be  a dominant  factor.
This is confirmed  when  changes  in provisioning  are  observed  through
time.  Concentrating  again on the United  States,  the changes  in the tax
treatment  of  provisions  in  1986  should,  if  anything,  have  made  additional  loan
loss  reserves  less  attractive. Yet it  was  in early  1987  that  the  principal
increases  in such reserves  by the US money  center  banks  were made.  Early
reports  in the  media  that  Citibank's  decision  was largely  influenced  by tax
considerations  appear  to be entirely  without  foundation,  as discussions  with
Citibank  and the  US Treasury  confirm. Indeed  meetings  between  Citibank  and
the Treasury  were held after  the bank's  announcement  of extra  reserving  to
clarify  the tax position  largely  because  of the confusion  caused  by these
press  reports. Similarly,  decisions  to  increase  provisions  by the  UK clearing
banks  were  made  even though  the  tax  treatment  of these  provisions  was  yet  to
be  agreed.
The large increases  in the  provisions  of the US and UK banks  and
their  effects  on bank  balance  sheets  are  shown  in  Tables  3,  4, 5  and  6.  From
Tables  3, 4 and 5 it may be seen that in the ease of the US banks,  the
additional  reserving  raised  their  reserve-to-developing-country  exposure  ratio
to something  around an average  of 25 percent;  although,  again there is
significant  variation  amongst  individual  banks.
Table 5 shows,  however,  that provisioning  generally  increased  the
primary  capital  to  assets  ratio,  but  uniformly  reduced  the  equity  component  of
primary  capital. Table  6 estimates  the  effects  of  differential  tax  r'elief  on
the UK  banks, assuming that provisions  are  uniformly  increased to  30- 14  -
percent.  It also shows  the  effects  of provisioning  on pre-tax  profits. As
far  as these  are  concerned  it  may  be seen  that  provisioning  shifts  two  of the
five  banks  from  profit  into  loss.  Not surprisingly  these  are  the  banks  with
the highest  developing  country  exposures. Furthermore,  for these  banks in
particular,  the  table shows how  the amount of  tax relief can make a
significant  difference  to their  equity  position.  For the relatively  less
exposed  banks  the  importance  of tax  relief  clearly  becomes  more  muted.
Given the figures  in Table 6, it is reasonably  easy to form a
retrospective  prediction  as to which  banks  amongst  the  UK clearers  would  be
the more and less likely  to set off a  train of provisioning.  Such a
prediction  might  have  been  more  difficult  to formulate  in  the  US case  on the
basis  of the figures  presented  in  Tables  3 and  4, though,  as  will  be seen  in
later  sections  of this  report,  it is possible  to offer  an explanation  as to
why Citibank  did take the lead, even though its balance  sheet  does not
necessarily  suggest  that  it  was  in  the  strongest  position  to  do so.
Taking into account the recent additions  to reserves,  Table 7
estimates  that the aggregation  of provisions  against  loans to developing
countries  held by banks in the principal  creditor  countries  is currently
rather  in  excess  of $70  billion.
In a sense  such  an estimation  begs  as many  questions  as it  answers.
One  very  important question it  raises is  whether current levels of
provisioning  are  adequate. A related  question  is  whether  provisions  will  be
increased  in  the  future?
One  way  of  approaching  these questions is  to  compare actual
provisioning  with the market  discount  on developing  country  debt.  Table  8
shows  the  market  prices  of a sample  of such  debt.  This table  reveals  that,- 15  -
with  the  exclusion  of Peru,  the  average  discount  on the  debt  of the  other  five
Latin American  debtors  was nearly  35 percent  in April 1987  and about  52.5
percent  by March  1988.  The table  shows  in the case  of Peru  how  a strongly
negative  assessment  of a country's  debt policies  will be reflected  in the
market  value of its debt.  It alsd shows,  however,  that the size of the
discount  will be influenced  by factors  which  are external  to the country
concerned.  Thus  the  discount  on  both  Mexican  and  Venezuelan  debt  increased  as
oil  prices  fell.
The  connection  between  the  size  of the  discount  on  developing  country
debt  and the  amount  of provisioning  required  is,  to some  extent,  supported  by
admittedly  sketchy information  on  individual  country  provisioning  by the
banks.  In broad  terms,  discussions  with  bankers  suggest  that  provisions  are
highest  against  those  countries  which  have  the  greatest  discos,nt  on  their  debt
in the secondary  market.  However,  the  relationship  is by no means  perfect.
In 1986, for example,  some  banks were setting  aside  significantly  greater
provisions  against  Brazilian  debt than  against  Venezuelan  debt,  even though
there  was a marginally  greater  discount  on Venezuelan  debt in the  secondary
market.  At  the  same time,  provisions  against Argentine debt  were
significantly  greater  than those  against  Chilean  debt even  though  there  was
very  little  difference  in  the  secondary  value  of  their  debt.
If one takes  the market  valuation  of developing  country  debt  as a
reasonably  accurate  indicator  of risk  and of its  net  present  value,  it  would
appear  most  banks  in some  countries  are  still  under-provisioned.  However,  it
is not entirely  clear  whether  the  market  valuation  of debt is an accurate
measure  of the  extent  to  which  the  banks  should  provision  against  it. First,
there is  the argument that the market is too thin and vulnerable  to-.16 -
distortions  to provide  a balanced  assessment  of risk.  Second,  some  bankers
argue that the debt is worth  more to them than  its market  value suggests
because  the banks  have leverage  with the debtor  countries. Third,  bankers
have  maintained  that  their  superior  position  with  respect  to  participation  in
debt  equity  swaps  and the  rate  of return  on such  investments  serves  to  raise
the value of the debt to them as compared  with the market  valuation.  II/
Certainly  leading  bankers  have  argued  that  they  do not  expect  to have  to use
the entire  amount  of their  loan loss reserves. Moreover  some comentators
claim  that  the  reluctance  of the  major  banks  to participate  in a recent  move
to swap  Mexican  debt for  banks,  suggest  that  they  value  this  debt  above  the
secondary  market  price.
Legitimate  doubt  may  be  expressed  over  the  above  arguments.  With  the
degree of current  participation  in the secondary  market,  there may be a
reasonable  presumption  that  it is relatively  efficient,  and that  it provides
as good a guide  as anything  to the  net present  value  of developing  country
debt.  121  Similarly  it  might  be  argued  that  the  leverage  on policy  that  the
banks  exert  is actually  activated  via the  intermediation  of the IMF  and the
World  Bank  and that  this  will  be incorporated  within  the  market's  valuation.
Furthermore, the  returns to  equity  investment  are  available to  all
partic.pants  in debt  equity  swaps  and  not just  the  banks,  and it is perhaps
11.  For this reason,  Citibank  have  argued  that  the  effective  discount  is no
more than 20 percent,  and not the  higher  level  shown  by the secondary
market.
12.  About  250  banks  and  50  non-financial  companies  are  reported  to  be trading
in the market  with a turnover  in 1987  expected  to be $10-15  billion.
Salomon  Brothers  have  argued  that  at this  level  of  business  market  prices
represent  a more reliable  consensus  view  than  the  subjective  opinions  of
top  banking  executives  which  creditors  currently  accept.- 17 -
doubtful  as to whether  the  banks  possess  superior  information  on investment
opportunities.  Finally,  when  a reasonable  estimate  of the  percent  value  for
the  principal  is  made,  it becomes  unclear  as to  whether  the  new  Mexican  banks
clearly  represented  a superior  asset  over  existing  debt.
Taking  secondary  market  valuations  as the  best  guide  to  country  risk
that  is  at present  available,  what  would  be the  implications  for  the  banks  of
raising  provisions  to the  levels  that  such  valuations  imply? On the  basis  of
the information  contained  in Tables  7 and  8, additional  provisions  of about
$70  billion  might  be  appropriate,  raising  total  global  provision  to  about  $140
billion. Additional  provisions  of this  amount  would  clearly  have  significant
implications  for  the  balance  sheets  of the provisioning  banks  and  might  well
be  deemed  to have  unacceptable  consequences  for  earnings,  profits  and  capital
adequacy.  13/
Having  set  the  factual  and  statistical  scene  the  next  section  goes  on
to examine in more detail the factors that may  influence  provisioning
decisions  by the  banks.
II.  FACTORS  AFFECTING  PROVISIONING
Without  doubt  there  is  a  range  of  factors  which,  in  some  sense,
impinge  on  the  decision  to  set  aside  provisions.  Some of  these  may be  fairly
13.  Phillips  and  Drew  in  their  regular  review  of  the  UK clearing  banks  point
out  how  difficult  it  is  to  make  comparisons  of  provisions  adequacy  between
banks.  However,  examination  of the ratio  between  provisions  and non-
performing  loans  (NPLs)  for  the  British  banking  industry  as a  whole  shows
that  this  has  increased  from  105  percent  in  1981  to 124  percent  in 1987,
i.e. provisions  have been rising relative  to NPLs, showing a  more
conservative  attitude  amongst  badk  managements.  Of course  this  does  not
necessarily  mean  that  provisions  are  now  adequate;  it  could  simply  reflect
the  extent  of inadequacy  in  earlier  years.- 18  -
general,  affecting  most banks  in a  broadly  similar  way, others  may be more
specific  to a group  of banks  - perhaps  in  a  particular  country,  or indeed  to
one specific  bank.  The  difficulty  is not so much in thinking  of a list  of
factors  which  might,  in principle,  influence  provisioning  but in classifying
these in a coherent  fashion  and in assigning  them  relative  weights.  With
regard  to the latter  problem,  the  quantity  and  quality  of the  data  does  not
permit any sophisticattd  empirical  investigations  of the issues  involved.
Instead,  the  empiricism  used  here  is  of  a fairly  casual  sort,  with  conclusions
on the  relative  importance  of different  factors  being  drawn  rather  more from
discussions  with  those  people  involved  in  the  actual  provisioning  decisions.
The first sub-section  below identifies  a number  of broad secular
trends  which  created  an environment  within  which  provisioning  was  more likely
to occur than formerly. The second  sub-section  then turns  to examine  some
rather  more  micro,  or bank-specific  factors. The  third  sub-section  endeavors
to attach  some approximate  weights  to these  factors  in the context  of two
specific  case studies;  Citibank's  decision  to  add  $3 billion  to its  loan  loss
reserves  on May 19, 1987,  and the related  decisions  by the other  US money
center  banks,  and  National  Westminster  Bank's  decision  to  add  466  million  to
its sovereign  debt provisions  on June 16, 1987 and, again, the related
decisions  by  the  other  UK  clearing  banks.
Secular  Factors
(a) Economic  performance  in  debtor  countries
Over the years,  and particularly  in the light  of experience  since
1982,  commercial  banks  have  come  to reassess  the  economic  performance  of the
highly  indebted  developing  countries  to which  they have  made loans  in the- 19  -
past,  and  therefore  to reagecss  also  the  risk  attached  to such  loans. Banks,
generally  speaking,  have  become  increasingly  sensitive  - some  might  even  argue
over-sensitive  - to  risk,  having  perhaps  failed  to  pay  sufficient  attention  to
it and too much attention  to nominal  return  during  the earlier  phases  of
lending.  14/
In  essence provisioning  reflects  a  reassessment  of  the  risks
associated  with  a given  portfolio  of  loans. As perceivcd  risks  rise,  so  there
will  be  a tendency  for  provisioning  against  these  risks  to  rise  as  well.
Economic  performance  amongst  the highly  indebted  countries  is most
unlikely  to be perfectly  positively  correlated,  even though,  to a certain
exte  t,  all  debtor  countries  will  be similarly  affected  by some  world  economic
developments  such  as  rising  interest  rates  and  increasing  protectionism.  This
lack  of correlation  will  encourage  banks  to  examine  countries  individually,  to
form  views  on their  separate  creditworthiness  and  on the  extent  to  which  they
should  provision  against  them. This  is  the  case  even  though  the  banks  usually
publicly provision  against a  group of  countries  rather than individual
countries.  Given  this  case  by case  approach,  it  may be  somewhat  misguided  to
look at data for  an aggregated  group  of countries. Yet, if this is done,
plenty  of evidence  may be found to support  the view that the underlying
economic  performance  of the  major  debtor  countries  had  been  deteriorating  over
recent yearso  Although some debtor nations have achieved a  notable
strengthening  in  their current account balance of  payments, this has
frequently  been achieved  against a  background  of stagnating  growth,  and
14.  For  a critical  review  of banks'  approaches  to country  risk  analysis,  see
Graham  Bird,  "New  Approaches  to  Country  Risk",  Lloyds  Bank  Review,  October
1986.- 20  -
falling  levels  of trade. In  many  ways  perhaps  the  most  worrying  sign  has  been
the falling  investment  ratio  in  many highly  indebted  countries. 15/  While
banks  may regard  some  measure  of short-run  domestic  demand  deflation  as an
appropriate  component  of economic  adjustment,  they  also recognize  that the
ability  of countries  to service  their debt hinges, in the long run, on
sustained  economic  growth.
Given  the central  significance  of investment  in  generating  economic
growth,  falling  investment  ratios  can  do little  other  than  cauce  concern  to
creditors  about  the  long-run  capacity  of  countries  to  cope  with  their  debt.
At  the same time as there are signs of deteriorating  economic
performance  in the highly  indebted  countries,  various  debt indicators  also
suggest  that  the  debt position  is itself  getting  worse. The  most  frequently
consulted  ratios,  such  as the  debt  service  ratio  and  the interest  payments  to
exports  ratio,  show a  significant  deterioration. Moreover,  the banks  can
hardly fail to acknowledge  that Lhe change  from positive  to negative  net
transfers  bring closer the threat  of default,  as the benefits  of debt
repudiation  rise  relative  to  the  costs.
Given  the  picture  as painted  above,  provisioning  may  be viewed  as an
entirely  appropriate  recognition  by the  banks  of  what  is,  according  to  various
criteria,  a worsening  situation.  A discrete  decision  to provision  might,  of
course, be associated  with some stochastic  shock  which weakens both the
economic  and  debt  position  of the  highly  indebte4  countr'ies,  o, ^s  a response
15.  Gross  investment  in  the  Baker  Plan  Group  of 15  heavily  indebted  countries
has  fallen  from  24 percent  of GNP  in  1982  to 17  percent  in  1986. Falling
import volumes  may also suggest  that fewer capital  goods are being
imported.- 21  -
to  a gradual  and  more  prolonged  weakening  in  their  oosition.  In  as  much  as it
is indeed  the  underlying  economic  strength  of the  debtor  countries  which is
the fundamental  determinant  of provisioning,  it might be anticipated  that
provisioning  activity will  vary  through time as  economic performance
changes. A decision  to set  aside  provisions  of  a certain  amount  at one  moment
in time does not therefore  mean that these will necessarily  be seen as
appropriate  in  the  future.
Since  the  economic performance  of  the  debtor countries is  a
phenomenon  which may be fairly  objectively  monitored  and which is largely
outside  the  control  of the  banks,  it  might  initially  be thought  that  all  banks
would  tend  to  hold  similar  provisions.  Further  thought,  however,  reveals  that
this  need  not be the  case.  Different  banks  will  have  different  exposures  in
different  countries,  may be more or less risk  averse,  and may interpret  a
given set of data differently. Their perceptions  of risk may therefore
vary. Moreover,  as  will  be seen  in  the  rest  of this  report,  there  are  various
other  factors  which influence  provisioning,  and  difference  amongst  the  banks
in relation  to these  factors  may account  for differences  in the extent  of
provisioning.
(b) World  macroeconomic  outlook
While  the above discussion  suggests  that provisioning  will be
affected  by the  past  and  contemporaneous  performance  of the  debtor  countries,
the banks are in fact taking  past performance  as an indicator  of future
performance;  it  is  this,  after  all,  that  will  affect  the  countries'  ability  to
service  their  debts.  The future  economic  performance  of debtor  countries
will,  of course,  depend  on the  performance  of the  industrialized  economies  of- 22 -
the world.  Various  models  and estimations  have been  made of the  degree  of
interdependence  between  the  developing  world  and  the  industrialized  world,  and
opinions  vary on its significance. Yet clearly  a scenario  of falling  or
stagnant  rates  of economic  growth  within  the  industrialized  countries,  rising
rates  of interest  and  increasing  protection  suggestion,  in combination,  that
debtor  countries  will  face  difficulties  in  expanding  their  export  earnings  and
in increasing  debt service  payments. In these  circumstances  the  banks  will
again tend to increase  the risk attached  to a given  portfolio  of loans  to
developing  countries  and may be encouraged  to increase  their provisions
against  such  loans. A pessimistic  global  economic  outlook  may  make  other  bank
assets also appear  more risky,  but perhaps  developing  country  loans are
particulirly  vulnerable  to  the  economic  variables  listed  above.
Since  bankers'  perceptions  in the  first  half )f  1987  were  of  a  world
economy  with  a slow  rate  of growth,  a  view  based  largely  on  projections  from
various  International  and  quasi  official  agencies,  it  follows  that  their  view
of the riskiness  of their  loans to developing  countries  was likely  to be
adversely  affected.
(c)  Changing  methods  of  risk  assessment
There  has  been  plenty  written  in the  literature  to suggest  that  the
banks'  techniques  for assessing  risk  as used to appraise  loans  during  the
1970s  were not necessarily  very scientific  in nature,  and there  are some
suggestions  that since that time they have improved  on their assessment
methods.  16/  With loans  being  continually  reassessed  it might  be expected
16.  See  Bird,  ibid.- 23  -
that  the  use  of different  techniques  would  result  in  different  perceptions  of
risk.
Although  this  argument  might,  in principle,  explain  why developing
country  loans  have gradually  come  to be regarded  as more  risky  by the  banks
that made them,  in practice  the modifications  in country  risk  analysis  are
probably  not sufficiently  important  to constitute  a major  factor. What is
true is that the more traditional  methods  of risk analysis  would also be
suggesting  increased  risk.  Furthermore,  as noted  earlier,  experiences  since
1982  have  simply  made  the  banks  more  risk  averse  than  they  were  before.
(d) Evolutionary  stages  in  the  debt  crisis
Some  commentators  maintain  that  the  debt  crisis  in the  period  since
1982  has gone through  a series  of stages. At different  times  emphasis  has
been placed  on economic  adjustment  in the debtor  countries,  rescheduling  of
existing  debt on more and less stringent  terms,  and the injection  of new
money.  An approach  encompassing  these  various  components  was built  into  the
Baker  Plan  of 1985.
The hope has clearly  been that these  various  policies  would, in
conjunction,  solve,  or at least  effectively  alleviate  the  debt problem. The
hope has not, however,  been  realized. Indeed,  in some  instances,  the  banks
have viewed  the approach  as becoming  less  successful  as time  has gone on.
They certainly  perceive  a "'weakening"  in IMF  conditionality  in recent  years.
Provisioning  may represent  a response  by the banks  born  out of frustration
with  the inability  of the  International  economic  system  as  a whole  to resolve
the  debt  problem.  Rather  than  sustain  the  belief,  or the  impression,  that  the
problem  will be resolved  within  a reasonable  time span,  provisioning  may be
seen  as  an internal  legitimation  by  the  banks  of  the  situation  as it  is.  In  a
sense  provisioning  reflects  the  gradual  change  of mood  amongst  bankers  from- 24  -
optimism,  or at least  guarded  optimism,  to pessimism  with respect  to the
prospects  for  solving  the  International  debt  problem.
(e) Internal  adjustment  within  the  banks
Emphasis  has usually  been  placed  in the  literature  on the  need for
adjustment  within  debtor  countries  brought  about  by the acquisition  of debt
and its related  obligations. While  this  need  cannot  be denied,  developing
country  debt has also brought  about  a need for  adjustment  within  the  banks
that  have  made  the  loans. Banks  have  indeed  been  engaged  in this  process  of
adjustment  by strengthening  their  capital  bases  and by looking  for new and
more  secure  lines  of business.  Although  some  banks  have  pursued  this  process
more  successfully  than  others, the  trend has  been  fairly general.
Provisioning  may  reflect the fact that within this secular process of
adjustment banks now  feel  sufficiently  strong to  stand the  cost  of
provisioning.
Moreover, internal  adjustment  within the banks  is unlikely to
comprise  only  growth  in  other  lines  of business.  The  banks  are  without  doubt
anxious  to remove  some  of their  developing  country  loans  from their  books.
However,  this  is difficult  to do while  the  loans  have  full  face  value  in the
balance  sheets  of the banks  and a  discounted  price  in the secondary  market.
Provisioning,  which essentially  recognizes  the market  valuation,  gives the
banks  much  more  flexibility  in  terms  of  how  they  can  manage  their  portfolio  of
loans,  and  may  be  seen  as a  necessary  component  in  the  banks'  overall  strategy
for  handling  their  developing  country  exposure.
(f) Changing  tax  and  regulatory  environment
In principle,  changes  in  the  tax  treatment  of  provisioning  and/or  the
regulatory  environment  might  be expected  to exert  an impact  on the  extent  to- 25  -
which  banks  set  aside  provisions.  However,  in  practice,  it is difficult  to
discern  a marked  impact.  The tax positions  seem frequently  to be rather
unclear  and ill-defined,  and,  whereas  regulators  have  generally  supported  the
idea of more provisioning  with  growing  enthusiasm,  the  extent  of regulation
has often  been no more than  to encourage  the  banks  to review  their  general
approach to the subject.  Certainly  those involved  in the provisioning
exercise  do not  ascribe  any  significant  role  to  tax  and  regulatory  factors  in
explaining  inter-temporal  changes  in the  extent  to  which  it  has  occurred. It
may, however,  and as noted in Section  1, be a more important  factor in
endeavoring to  explain the  diffeting behavior of  banks  in  different
countries.  Furthermore,  to  argue  that  it  has  not  been  an important  factor  in
the past is not to argue  that it might  not be an important  factor  in the
future.  It is difficult  to believe  that  a more  interventionist  approach  by
regulators  or a clearer  and  more cohesive  statement  of the  tax  treatment  of
provisioning  would be completely  inconsequential,  though  its significance
might  still  be  marginal  in  relation  to  other  factors.
The conclusion  from  the  above  discussion  of secular  factors  is that
there  were indeed  certain  trends  in  effect  during  the  mid-1980s  which  pointed
in  the  direction  of  greater  provisioning.  Of these  perhaps  the  most  important
were the  changing  assessment  of the  economic  performance  of debtor  countries
and a desire  by the banks  to do something  positive  in terms  of their  own
balance  sheets.  But these  secular  trends  hardly  explain  why  the surge  of
provisioning  in the  summer  of 1987  occurred  when  it  did,  nor  do they  explain
entirely  satisfactorily  why  different  banks  behaved  in  different  ways.  It is
to an examination  of more proximate  and  bank-specific  factors  that we now
turn.- 26  -
Micro  Factors
(a) Market  valuation
While  banks  may  set  out  to  maximize  profits,  and  while  their  behavior
may be most nearly  approximated  by applying  thi..  traditional  theory  of the
firm,  it  is  also  the  case  that  they  are  concerned  about  their  market  valuation
as  reflected  by their  share  price. In  relation  to  this,  they  are  sensitive  to
the  rating  they  receive  from  bank  analysts.
Prior  to the wave  of extra  provisioning  begun  by Citibank  in early
sumer  1987,  banks  were  under  significant  market  pressure  to acknowledge  the
weakness  of many of their  developing  country  loans. This  pressure  took  the
form  of a share  price  which  was  largely  discounted  in  proportion  to individual
bank's  exposure  in particular  countries,  a discount  on the secondary  market
value of developing  country debt, and, connected  with these phenomena,
somewhat  gloomy  reports  on the  banking  sector  in general  and  the relatively
highly exposed  banks in particular  from  market  analysts.  The market  had
essentially  discounted  developing  country  debt in advance  of the banks,  and
bank  provisioning  can  be seen  as,  in  some  sense,  a response  to  and  recognition
of  this  judgement.
It is not coincidental,  therefore,  that  as banks  provisioned  their
share  price  tended  to rise  (as  confirmed  by the  data in  Table  10). Normally,
of course,  one would expect  share  price  and  profitability  to be positively
related  but  in this  case  it  seems  that  the  market  was  welcoming  what  was  seen
as a more realistic  approach  by  the  banks. The  fact  that  the  banks  had  come
formally  to accept  the  risks  associated  with their  developing  country  loans
raised  market  confidence  in  the  provisioning  banks.
Furthermore,  it was perhaps,  in part,  through  the  market  mechanism
that actions by  key  debtor nations affected the  banks  provisioning- 27  -
decisions.  Although  Peru's  limitation  of  debt  servicing  had  relatively  little
effect  on market  mood,  Brazil's  suspension  of interest  payments  did have  an
effect,  and,  through  this  indirect  route,  if  not  through  more  direct  routes  to
be  outlined  below,  Brazil's  actions  are  relevant  in  seeking  to  explain  why  the
banks  took  the  decisions  that  they  did  at  the  time  that  they  did.
(b) The  competitive  process
It needs to be remembered  that banks  are in competition  with one
another.  Even though  there  may be elements  of market  segmentation,  this  is
not  sufficiently  pronounced  to allow banks to have effective  areas of
monopoly.  Within the competitive  process banks employ various weapons
covering  both the range and price of the services  they offer to their
customers.  Banks also compete  via marketing  and advertising. Given the
significance  of competition  amongst  the  banks,  and  since  the  structure  of the
banking  industry  is such in most countries  that large  banks are able to
identify  their  principal  competitors,  it  might  be supposed  that  any decision
made  by one  bank  will  take  into  account  its  effects  on competitor  banks,  and,
in turn,  their  likely  responses.
In this type of market  environment  firms  will be inclined  to take
actions  which  they  deem to be relatively  advantageous.  Even  an  action  which
camages  short-run  earnings  and profits  might  become  attractive  if it forces
:ompetitors  to take similar  actions  which  have  effects  on their  earnings  and
profits  which  are even  more  damaging. In such  an environment  the  initiating
firm will strengthen  its relative  position  within the industry.  Since
provisioning  affects  earnings,  profits,  and share  prices,  it seems  likely
therefore  that  the  implications  of  it  for  a bank's  competitive  position  within
the  industry  will  feature  in  the  decision.- 28  -
How important  a factor  this  is depends  on how  wide the  differences
are between  banks in terms  of their  ability  to set  aside  provisions  and  how
aggressively  competitive  are  the  banks  in the  relatively  stronger  positions.
In a highly  competitive  environment,  a decision  by one bank to raise its
provisions  might  even  be  viewed  as  a predatory  policy,  akin  to  the  practice  of
predatory  pricing  in  other  industries.  17/
(c) The  politics  of  decision  making
The discussion  in points (a) and (b) above suggests  that financial  and
economic  factors  are  the  only  ones  that  have  an effect  on  bank  decisions.  It
needs to be recalled,  however,  that banks  are bureaucratic  structures  and
decisions  will reflect  managerial  utility  functions.  Changing  managerial
regimes  within  any firm  may cause  a shift  in policy. An incoming  Chairman
may, for  example,  wish to distance  himself  (or  herself)  from  decisions  taken
by a predecessor  and  to impose  a new  personality  and  authority. An outgoing
Chairman  may  wish to secure  the  company's  position  before  departing  in  order
to  minimize  the  personal  risk  of being  retrospectively  blamed  for  ill-founded
decisions.
17.  Some  commentators  have  certainly identified a  new  era  of  the
entrepreneurial  spirit  of  competition. Similarly,  and somewhat  more
graphically,  the Chairman  of Citibank  has been described  by a fellow
banker  as  the  "Rambo of  the  money  center  banks."- 29  -
While  it is difficult  to  model  these  factors  and to  treat  them  in  a
rigorous way, those with experience  of  working in large organizations
recognize  that personalities  and internal  organizational  politics  are often
important  factors  in decision  making.  It might  be unwise,  therefore,  to
ignore  such  influences  when  trying  to  explain  commercial  bank  provisioning.
(d) The  games  theory  of  debtor-creditor  relations
Provisioning  by the banks has not been an isolated  action, but
represents  one  component  in  an ongoing  set  of negotiations  and  relationships
between  debtor countries  and creditor  banks.  While the debtors  wish to
minimize  their servicing  obligations  without  damaging  their prospects  of
future market access, the banks wish to maximize  their receipts)  Such
maximization  may involve  a&reeing  to terms  which  are not  so stringent  as to
encourage  debtors to opt  for all out default.  Within such a  set of
negotiations  the participants  will  be constantly  "positioning"  and trying  to
send "signals"  to each other designed  to strengthen  their own bargaining
stance.  It may  be anticipated  that participants  will sometimes  adopt
positions  which  are  more conciliatory  and at other  times  less  conciliatory.
Similarly  the  adoption  of a new position  by one side  will tend to induce  a
change  in  the  position  adopted  by the  other  side.
Within  this  context, a  decision by  banks to  increase their
provisioning  against  claims  on  developing  countries  might  be interpreted  as a
desire  to  send  a  new  signal to  debtors in  advance of  forthcoming
negotiations.  Such  action  could  be initiated  by the  banks  or  could  represent
a response  to a perceived  change  of position  by a particular  debtor  or group
of debtors.- 30  -
However,  there  is considerable  ambiguity  about  what signal  is being
transmitted  by increased  provisioning.  From  one  point  of  view it  may  be seen
as a  softening  in the bank's position  since,  in effect, it reflects  a
recognition  by the banks  that  they are  unlikely  to receive  full payment  on
their developing  country  loans.  The whole rationale  of provisioning  is
associated  with such  increased  risks.  From  this  angle,  the signal  might  be
seen  as one  which  says  that  the  banks,  having  provisioned,  are  now  in  a better
position,  and  more  willing,  to  make  concessions  to  the  debtors.
Bankers  vigorously  deny  that  this  is  the  signal  that  they  are  sending
via provisioning. Indeed,  they  tend  to down  play  the  entire  game-theoretic
approach  to provisioning.  If  anything,  however,  they  argue  that  provisioning
suggests  that  the banks  will adopt  a "tougher"  or "more  realistic"  position
vis-a-vis  borrowers  in rescheduling  negotiations.  The logic  here seems to
involve  two  elements. First,  the  banks  are  now  in  a better  position  to  "take
a  hit" on their  developing  country  loans. And  second,  since  provisions  are
now being  set  aside  against  such  developing  country  loans,  it is going  to  be
more  difficult  for  debtor  countries  to  attract  new  money  from  the  banks.
Consideration  of these  elements  suggests  that while  there  is some
truth  in the  second  (which  is  examined  more  fully  later  in  the  section  of the
report  dealing  with the implication  of provisioning),  the first  argument  is
more doubtful. The demonstration  by the banks  that  they  are in a stronger
position  to  withstand  a "hit"  may  actually  make  it  more  likely  that  they  will
have to sustain one.  Statements  by bankers  that provisioning  does not
represent  a softer  position  by the  banks  and  may,  what is more,  represent  a
harder  one would  seem  to be designed  merely  to limit  the damage  that  might- 31 -
otherwise  be done  to their  bargaining  position. Chances  of the  banks  being
fully  repaid  would  not seem  to be enhanced  by actions  which  suggest  that  the
banks  accept  that  they  are  unlikely  to  be fully  repaid.
Given  the  ambiguity  over  the  way in  which  debtors  might  be expected
to interpret  bank  provisioning,  it is difficult  to believe  that  the increase
in provisioning  during  mid-1987  was purely  a  positioning  response  to the
Brazilian  decision  to suspend  interest  payments  in  early  1987.
Of course  banks  will  not  only  be concerned  about  how  their  decisions
will  be interpreted  by  the  debtor  countries.  They  also  have  to  consider  their
relationships  with the official  sector.  Here,  in an environment  where  the
banks  feel  that  excessive  pressure  has  been  put  on them  to provide  new  money
in recent negotiations --  in particular those involving Mexico --  and see
themselves  as often  assuming  the  role  of lender  of last resort,  they  might
have  been  pleased  to  send  a message,  via  provisioning,  that  new  money  would  be
less easily  available  in the future,  and thereby  put  more pressure  on the
official  sector.  Especially  since the banks  have been quite critical  of
certain  elements  of the official  sector,  notably  the  Paris  Club,  the export
guarantee  agencies,  and,  lately,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF).
Although  the above discussion  has tended  to lump all the banks
together,  it is quite  possible  that  there  are slight,  but  still  significant,
differences  between  banks  in the signals  they  wish  to send  individual  debtor
countries. A bank  with a relatively  large  exposure  in a particular  country
may be inclined  to adopt a rather  different  approach  than a bank with a
smaller  exposure.- 32  -
(e) Bank  exposure,  profitability  and  internal  bank  strategy
As suggested  earlier,  some  banks  will be in a stronger  position  to
provision  than  others. Broadly  speaking,  the  more  profitable  is the  bank  and
the greater  its ability  to foster  and develop  other  lines  of business,  the
more  inclined  it  will  be  to set  aside  relatively  large  provisions.  Indeed,  it
will  be  the  banks  with  the  smallest  exposure  in  developing  countries  that  will
be inclined  to set  aside  the largest  proportionate  provisions  against  these
loans  because  the  absolute  size  of  the  provisions  will  be small  in  relation  to
those  of other  banks  that  are  more  heavily  exposed. 18/
In addition  to this, however,  some banks may be in a  stronger
position  to exploit  the  opportunity  for  debt-equity  swaps,  which,  as  will be
seen later,  is facilitated  by provisioning.  A bank  with a relatively  wide
network  of branches  and  with  good  information  about  investment  opportunities
in developing  countries  may be more enthusiastic  about the scope  for such
swaps  and  may therefore  be more anxious  to prepare  the  ground  for them.  A
bank  with  a less  sanguine  attitude  to swaps  may  be  expected  to  be less  anxious
to  engage  in  provisioning.
(f) Tax  and  regulatory  environment
As was noted earlier  in the report,  perhaps  the most noticeable
characteristic  amongst differences  between International  banks in  their
approaches  to provisioning  is  their  national  identity.  To  some  extent  this  is
explained  by the factors  already  listed.  German  banks,  for example,  with
18.  This  is  confirmed  by the  data  given  in  Section  I.- 33  -
relatively  little  exposure  in  developing  countries  might  be expected  to hold
larger reserves  against their loans than US banks.  However,  national
variations  also  suggest  that  differences  in  national  regulations  and  tax  laws
may also exert  some impact. This is difficult  to assess  in a thorough  way
because  in many  cases,  and  as noted  in Section  I, the  regulatory  environment
rests  as  much  on  unrecorded understandings  as  on  formal  sets  of
arrangements.  What is more,  the tax  treatment  of provisioning  also  remains
far from clear in many countries. Although  banks  may be able to offset
incurred  losses  or write  downs  against  tax,  provisioning  does  not  necessarily
imply  a formal  write  down. To  circumvent  such  distinctions  Japanese  banks,  in
a  much  reported  move,  sold  a proportion  of  their  developing  country  loans  at  a
discount  to  an offshore  company  which  they  jointly  owned.  91
Again, as discovered  in Section  I, perhaps  the most liberal  tax
legislation  exists  in Germany  where  following  a "care  il evaluation"  of the
value  of  their  assets,  banks  may  correct  an  over-valuation  of these  assets  and
may deduct  any resulting  loss  from  taxable  profits. It is  not surprising  to
find  therefore  that  German  banks  have  historically  provisioned  heavily. While
this may  reflect the  traditional  conservatism  of  German bankers, tax
legislation  is  also  likely  to  have  been  an  important  factor.
Before  leaving  the  question  of  the  tax  and  regulatory  environment,  it
may  be noted  that  while  this  may  have  an  effect  on provisioning,  provisioning
may  itself  have  an effect  on  the  tax  and  regulatory  environment.  Provisioning
may,  for  example,  be made  by the  banks  in  the  hope  of  putting  pressure  on  the
19.  Reports  are  that  Japanese  banks  sold  $500  million  of  Mexican  debt  at a 42
percent  discount  to  a  Cayman  Island  company  owned  by  28  of  them.- 34 -
tax  authorities  to  make tax  concessions.  Similarly  greater  provisioning  may
be used by the  banks  in an attempt  to forestall  the introduction  of formal
regulations  which  would  mandate  reserves  against  specific  countries.
Assigning  Relative  Importance:  Case  Studies
What we have done so far is to assemble  a list  of factors  which
might,  in  principle,  have  an influence  on commercial  bank  provisioning  against
developing  country  loans.  What now needs to be done is to assign  some
relative  importance  to these  factors. In  attempt  to  do this  we focus  here  on
the  spate  of additional  commercial  bank  provisioning  that  was  observed  during
mid-1987.
First  of all, drawing  on the  distinction  between  secular  and micro
factors,  it seems  that  secular  factors  were  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for
provisioning  to occur.  Stated  most extremely,  if there  had not been a
deterioration  in the economic  and debt positions  of the highly indebted
countries,  there  would  have  been  little  need  for  banks  to  provision.  Yet  this
gradual deterioration  does not seem to have been the proximate  cause of
provisioning.
Taking  the  case  of the  extra  loan  loss  reserves  made  by the  US  money
center  banks,  much of this  may be seen as a response  to the lead set  by
Citibank.  Provisioning  by the  other  banks  was in defense  of their  market
position. Most representatives  of such  banks  suggest  that extra  provisions
would  not have been set aside  had it not been for  the Citibank  move.  The
question  then  becomes  why Citibank  decided  to increase  its  provisions.  Some
guidance  is  provided  by  Citibank's  own  account  which  emphasizes  the  importance- 35  -
of market  pressures,  and the desire  to create  more flexibility  within  its
balance  sheet  and  to pursue  debt  equity  swaps. However,  it is reasonable  to
presume  that  Citibank  would  not  necessarily  provide  a full  analysis  of its  own
decision. The  general  consensus  amongst  competitors  and  commentators  is that
there  were other important  factors. First,  there  was the desire  to gain a
competitive  advantage  over other US money center banks.  The Citibank
announcement  was  carefully  orchestrated  and well marketed, and  it did
undoubtedly  embarrass  some  of the  other  banks. Although  Citibank  wac  heavily
exposed  in developing  countries  in absolute  terms  at end 1986  and had  more
exposure  than  the  other  money  center  banks,  it  s exposure  to equity  ratio  was
significally  below  that of Bank of America and Manufacturers  Hanover,  was
broadly  s  milar to that of Chase  Manhattan  and Chemical  Bank,  was somewhat
above  that  of Bankers  Trust  and signifcantly  above  that  of the  other  smaller
U.S. Citibank  was therefore not in a uniformity  stronger  position  to set
aside provisions,  but was in a rather  stronger  position  than its closest
competition,  particularly  given its attitude  towards debt equity swaps.
Second, there was the personality  of the Citibank  chairman,  which some
observers  feel  suggests  that  internal  bank  politics  may  have  been  a factor.
Perhaps  rather  less  important  was  the  desire  to send  a coded  message
to debtors,  and to Brazil  in particular,  since,  as mentioned  above, the
precise  message  is  difficult  to decode. Also  apparently  of no importance  was
the  tax  position,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  early  press  reports  suggested  that
tax  advantages  lay  at the  heart  of the  decision.
Similarly,  the regulatory  environment  seems  to have been of little
relevance,  except  to the extent  that some observers  feel that  Citibank  was- 36  -
anxious  J4o forestall  moves to change  the regulations  in a way which would
require  greater  specific  provisioning.
Broadly the same story emerges  when one examines  the additional
provisiohing  undertaken  by the  UK clearing  banks. Here  again  the  process  wins
led by the bank regarded  as perhaps  the  most aggressively  competitive,  the
NationalsWestminster  Bank.  Moreover,  National  Westminster,  with relatively
low  loan  iqxposures  in  developing  countries,  was in the strongest  position  to
provision  against such loans.  As with the Citibank  move, Nat. West's
additional  provisioning  strengthened  its  market  position  and  this  induced  the
other cleaning  banks to  take similar  measures.  Again in the UK,  the
regulatory  environment  and  the  tax  position  with  respect  to provisioning  does
not seem to have had a  significant  impact.  Although  UK banks  had be,en
encouraged  by bank  regulators  --  essentially  the  Bank  of  England  --  to reviaew
the adequacy  of their provisions,  the tax treatment  of provisioning  was
undefined  at the  time  the  National  Westminster  took  its  decision.  Discussions
with representatives  of  National  Westminster  also  suggest  that  game-theoretic
explanations  did  not  have  an important  part  to play. Instead  the  feeling  was
that Citibank's  move had altered  the "market  environment"  and that it was
therefore  an appropriate  time  for  the  bank  to bring  greater  realism  into  its
accounts.  In the case of Nat.  West there  seems  to have  been  a less  well-
articulated  internal  bank  strategy  for  handling  its  exposure  than  there  was  in
the  case  of Citibank.
This  review  of the  causes  of provisioning  suggests  that  it  reflects  a
combination  of general secular  trehds  and narrower,  more bank specific,
factors.  Without  doubt  the overall  performance  of debtor  countries  in the- 37  -
mid-1980s  and beyond  was providing  little  evidence  that their  ability to
service  debt was going  to improve  in the  short  run.  The  financiAl  markets
certainly  made this  assessment,  which  was  reinforced  by  greater  difficulties
in  rescheduling  and  by  unilateral  decisions  by  key  debtors  to  limitrrtheir  debt
payments. As  a result  the  market  valuation  of the  banks'  loans  toideveloping
countries  was discounted.  Provisioning  represented  a  response to this
deteriorating  situation. However,  within  the  banking  industry,  provisioning
has also been used in a  competitive  way; there  was no uniformly  agreed
approach  to it,  but rather  one  of action  and  counter  action. Although  banks
have  been  anxious  to ensure  that  their  negotiating  position  is  not  damaged  by
provisioning,  it is doubtful  whether the prime rationale  was to send a
positioning  signal  to  debtors. Similarly,  while  different  regulatory  and  tax
environments  may help to explain  why banks in different  countries  have
provisioned  to different  extents,  changes  in this  environment  do not  seem  to
have  exerted  any  discernible  impact  on  provisioning  over  time.
Having  examined  what  factors  caused  banks  to provision  more  heavily,
we can now  move on in the  next section  to examine  the implications  of such
decisions.
III.  DIPLICATIONS  OP PROVISIONING
According to  one point of  view the implications  of  increased
provisioning  are likely  to be rather  marginal,  since it is essential  an
accounting  adjustment  which  acknowledges  and  formalizes  a weakness  in banks'
balance  sheets  which  existed  beforehand.  Although  there  would  appear  to be
some  truth  in  this  view,  it is possible  to  examine  the  potential  implications- 38  -
of  provisioning  in  a  rather  more  thorough  and  systematic  way.
In  this  section we  approach the  question by  looking at  the
implications  for the various actors involved  in the  Internetional  debt
problem;  the banks,  the debtor  countries  and  the official  sector. We also
briefly  examine  the  implications  of provisioning  for  relations  between  these
various  actors.
(a) For  the  banks
As already  noted,  provisioning  has  the  effect  of bringing  the  banks'
actual  balance  sheets  more in line  with the  market  perception  of what they
should  look like.  Any  discrepancy  of this  kind  between  the  market  view  and
the  banks'  view,  as illustrated  by tJeir  published  balance  sheets,  will  be a
cause  of concern  within  the  market  and  will  damage  confidence  in the banks.
Removal  of this  discrepancy  will  tend  to  restore  a measure  of  confidence.  It
might  have  been anticipated,  as  bankers themselves  clearly did,  that
provisioning  would  improve  the  banks'  market  position.  Data  given  in  Table  10
confirm the positive short-run  effect of  provisioning  on  banks' stock
prices.  The Table also suggests,  when read in conjunction  with Table 5
showing  the  dates  of provisioning,  that  it  was the  earlier  provisioners  that
enjoyed  the  greatest  stock  price  increase.
However,  it is perhaps  more doubtful  how durable  this improvement
will be.  After all, provisioning  does nothing  to strengthen  the basic
position  of those  banks  which  have  suspect  developing  country  loans  on their
books.  Neither,  as will be seen  below,  does  it really  do anything  to raise
the  probability  that  debtors  will  be  able  to  service  their  debt  obligations.- 39  -
The expectation  might therefore  be that provisioning  would  have a
short-run  beneficial  effect  on banks'  share  prices,  but that in the longer
term  the  relative  market  valuation  of the  banks  would  not increase.  For  this
to occur  the banks  would  need  to shed  some  of their  developing  country  loans
and expand  profitable  new lines  of business.  Alternatively,  the economic
performance  and  prospects  of  the  debtors  would  need  to  improve  significantly.
Clearly  banks  with  less  exposure  in  developing  countries  will  tend  to
have a  stronger  market  position  than those  with a heavy concentration  of
loans,  although  even non-exposed  banks  may find it difficult  to distance
themselves  completely  from  the  market's  judgement  of the  heavily  exposed  one,
not  least  because  banks'  fortunes  may,  to  an extent,  be inter-related  through
the  inter-bank  market.
The  anxiety  to  shed  developing  country  debt  will,  with  little  doubt,
encourage  banks  to consider  the scope  for  debt sales,  and for debt equity
swaps.  Either one of  these will be encouraged  by provisioning  which
marginalizes  the  banks'  decision  to accept  a discounted  price  for  developing
country  debt.
In  the  past  the  quantity  of  debt  swaps  has  been  constrained,  in  part,
by  the  unwillingness  of  the  US banks  to  accept  a reduction  in the  face  value
of  their  developing  country  assets.  Although  increasing  loan  loss  reserves  is
not the same  thing  as writing  down  debt,  it does  suggest  a presumption  that
some debt  will  need to be written  down.  For this  reason  one constraint  on
debt  conversion  will  be relaxed  by  provisioning.
How significant  this relaxation  is depends  on how effective  the
constraint  is.  Some observers  have  argued  that  debt swap  activity  is more- 40  -
effectively  constrained  by the  range  of suitable  equity  investments  in  highly
indebted  countries  and by the  attitudes  of the  debtor  country  governments  to
foreign  investment.  If these  are indeed  the effective  constraints,  then
provisioning  is unlikely  to have significant  implications  for the level  of
debt  swapping.
Even  amongst  bankers  there  are  significantly  different  views  on just
how important  debt swapping  will  be, though  all  agree  that  provisionirng  has
the important  effect of making their loan portfolios  more flexible  or
"malleable." Some bankers  -ee  debt  equity  swaps  as a key integral  part of
their  internal  strategy. Citibank,  for  example,  made press  announcements  to
this  effect  when  reporting  its  additional  loan  loss  reserves. Others  see  the
potential  for debt  swaps  as being  small  in relation  to the size  of the  debt
involved. While there  is, then,  some  debate  over the precise  size  of the
impact  of provisioning  on debt swap activity,  there  is little  disagreement
over the  point  that,  with  other  things  remaining  constant,  provisioning  will
encourage  banks  to  engage  in  more  debt  swapping  than  would  otherwise  have  been
the  case.  20/
There is similarly  little  disagreement  that provisioning  will make
banks  more unwilling  to put  new  money  into  developing  countries. The logic
here  is  simply  that  if  a  bank  has  provisioned  against  old  loans  it  will  also
*1
20.  For a more detailed  analysis  of debt swapping  see, Graham  Bird,  "Debt
Swapping  in  Developing  Countries:  A Preliminary  Investigation,"  Journal
of  Development  Studies,  (forthcoming).- 41  -
need  to provision  against  new  ones.  Provisioning  is,  in  effect,  a tax  on  new
developing  country  loans  and  may  therefore  be  expected  to  reduce  the  supply  of
such  loans.
But provisioning  may reduce  the supply  of new bank loans  in other
ways as  well.  First, small banks may  become even more reluctant to
participate  in new  money  packages  since  they  see  the  larger  banks  as being  in
a stronger  financial  position.  The  argument  that  the  involvement  of the  small
banks  is  required  to sustain  the  larger  banks,  and  therefore,  the  stability  of
financial  markets,  may be more easily  rejected  than it has been formerly.
Second,  inasmuch  as provisioning  has been used, or has been perceived  as
having  been  used,  by some  banks  as  an aggressive  weapon  of  competition,  it  may
be more difficult  to get the necessary  degree  of agreement  amongst  banks  to
put  together  new  moncy  packages.
More  generally,  it  might  be  expected  that  banks  with  relatively  large
provisions  will be more inclined  to favor some form of debt relief to
developing  countries  in  preference  to  the  injection  of  new  money. Indeed,  the
extent  of provisioning  has been  used in the  past to explain  the  different
attitudes  of US  and  German  banks  to  the  debt  problem,  with  the  former  holding
relatively  low loan loss reserves  and favoring  new  money  as opposed  to any
form  of debt  relief. The gloomy  prospect  from  the  debtors'  point  of view  is
that,  while  extra  provisioning  may  disincline  the  US money  center  banks  and
other  International  banks  from  making  available  new  money,  it  may  not  include
them towards  greater  debt relief.  Indeed  in their public  pronouncements
bankers  are  adamant  that  additional  provisioning  does  not  imply  that  the  banks
are prepared  to accept  anything  less  than the full servicing  and repayment- 42  -
obligations  associated  with the developing  country  loans.  They frequently
maintain  that  provisioning  is a response  to market  perceptions  of effective
default  risk  rather  than  a reflection  of their  own  perceptions.
Of course  care  has  to be exercised  in interpreting  such  statements.
Bankers  anxious  to maximize  the  chance  of being  fully  repaid  are  unlikely  to
make statements  to the effect  that they do not expect  this to be what
happens.  They  wilL  be aware  of the  fact  that  such  prophecies  would  stand  a
good chance  of becoming  self-fulfilling,  with debtor  countries  immediately
adopting  a tougher  stance  in  debt  negotiations.
Many bankers  in  fact  accept  that  a degree  of debt  forgiveness  may  be
appropriate  for  some  of the  smaller  debtor  countries  which  they  concede  may  be
in intractable  economic  difficulties.  But,  at  the  same  time,  they  are  worried
that it would be difficult,  in practice,  to offer significantly  different
terms  to different  debtor  countries,  and  that  the  large  debtor  nations  would
expect  to  receive  terms  similar  to  the  most  favored  debtor.
A more  detached  viewing  of the  facts  suggests  that  it  may  have  been
anticipated  that  bankers  would  say  exactly  what  they  have  been  saying. But  it
is  difficult  to  reconcile  actions  which  prepare  the  banks  for  some  measure  of
loss on their  loans  with  words  which  say  that  such  losses  are  not expected.
On the assumption  that  actions  generally  speak  louder  than  words,  it seems
reasonable  to conclude  that  the  banks  have  accepted  that  they  will  be forced
to grant  a measure  of debt forgiveness.  The  choice  of words  is designed  to
try  and  minimize  the  banks'  losses.
While  clearly  the  choice  of technique  adopted  by the  banks  for  giving
de facto  debt relief  is aimed  at minimizing  the amount  of such  relief,  an- 43  -
interesting  and  related  question  is  whether  this  technique  is  optimal  from  the
debtors'  point  of view,  or indeed  systemically.  Does  the  banks  chosen  route
maximize  the real  relief  for  any  given  financial  cost?  Or, in  other  words,
does it represent  an efficient  way  of handling  the international  debt
problem?  In principle,  an alternative  might  be for the  banks  to opt for  a
structured,  co-ordinated  and  centrally  administered  write  down  of loans,  to  be
attached  to  policy  conditionality  applied  to  the  debtor  nations.
Banks  may be forced  by circumstances  to concede  to some  degree  of
relief. Indeed  the  scenario  painted  by many  bankers  is consistent  with  this
conclusion,  even though  it may not be the conclusion  they  themselves  draw.
First, there  is  the  deteriorating  performance  of  the highly indebted
countries. Second,  there  is  the  gloomy  global  macroeconomic  outlook. Third,
there is the fact that, in general,  significant  quantities  of new monies
cannot  be expected  from  the  banks. If  neither  private  foreign  investment  nor
the  official  sector  fills  the  projected  financing  gap, the  only  option  left
open for debtor  countries  is to reduce  their  demand  for foreign  exchange
through  the  imposition  of direct  import  limiting  measures  or through  domestic
demand  deflation;  unless,  that  is,  the  debtors  decide  to reduce  their  demand
for  foreign  exchange  by defaulting  on their  debt  obligations.
Banks  need  to recognize  and  address  the  issue  that,  while  formalized
debt relief  does possess  the problem  of "moral  hazard"  touched  on above,
failure  to provide  it may induce  outright  defaults  which will make their
losses  even  greater. This,  of course,  is the  trump  card  that  debtors  possess
in  their  game-theoretic  negotiations  with  the  banks.
However,  while,  for  these  reasons,  provisioning  might  be seen  as a- 44  -
potential  step  towards  some  greater  measure  of debt  relief,  the  way in  which
it has been enacted  may have damaged  the cohesiveness  of the banks and
therefore  have  made  co-ordinated  approaches  more difficult  to implement. As
noted  above,  some  US  money  center  banks  feel  that  Citibank's  decisions  to  add
to its  loan  loss  reserves  was,  in  part  ac least,  a predatory  move  designed  to
embarrass  them and to give Citibank  a competitive  advantage.  This could
change  attitudes  towards  what  has  been  the  co-operative  fashion  in  which  debt
negotiations  have been handled  by the banks,  and this at a time when the
growing  reluctance  of the  small  banks'to  participate  in  new  loans  is  likely  to
place  a  larger  burden  on  the  large  money  center  banks. Indeed  one  of the  most
frequently  cited  criticisms  of Citibank's  move from  the  rest  of the  banking
community  is precisely  that it has disrupted  what was formerly  co-operative
approach  by the  banks,  and that  it  will  make  the  negotiation  of new packages
more  problematical.
This  argument  should  not,  however,  be  taken  too  far.  Banks  are
always  likely  to  take  decisions  based  on  what  they  see  as being  in their  own
best  interests; and  although greater provisioning  may  influence this
perception,  decisions  within  any  set  of debt  negotiations  are  unlikely  to be
motivated  simply  out of desire  to make life difficult  for one particular
competitor.  While  the  discussions  amongst  the  banks  may  therefore  be  somewhat
less  fraternal  than  they  might  have been,  outcomes  will be similar  to those
that  wouild have  resulted  had  the  decisions  to  add  to  loan  loss  reserves  been
collaboratively  agreed.
,Again  in  trying  to  gauge  the  relative  importance  of  the  factors
discusse'd.above,  bankers  clearly  feel  that  the  most  significant  implication  of- 45  -
provisioning  for  them  is the  extra  flexibility  it  gives  in  the  management  of
their balance  sheets.  Increased  loan loss reserves  provide  them with the
scope to  pursue a  number of  options which would otherwise have been
effectively  unavailable.  Apart  from  this,  and  in  and  of itself,  provisioning
is  not  seen  by  bankers  as  having  hugely  significant  implications  for  them.
(b) For  the  indebted  countries
The consequences  of provisioning  for the  highly  indebted  borrowing
countries  are generally  regarded  as being  even  less  significant  than  for  the
banks.  As  pointed out  by  country representatives  on many occasions,
provisioning  does  nothing  to  alter  their  contractual  debt-related  obligations.
Even so, there are, in principle,  channels  through  which extra
commercial bank  provisioning  might  have  consequences  for  the  debtor
countries.  First,  it may alter  the negotiating  environment;  altering  the
relative strengths  of the debtors'  and creditors'  bargaining  positions.
Although,  as already  seen,  the banks  argue strongly  that provisioning  is a
sign  of their  hardening  or  "more  realistic"  attitude  towards  certain  borrowing
countries,  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  this  with  the  changing  expectations  of
debt servicing  that  provisioning  implies.  Of course  just  as the  banks  would
not be expected  to publicize  a softening  in their  attitudes  if indeed  this
exists,  the borrowing  countries  would  not be expected  necessarily--to  reveal
their  true interpretation  of the effect  of provisioning  on thei.flbargaining
strength.  Press stories therefore  not  surprisingly  present the debtor
countries'  response  to provisioning  as having  been  fairly  neutrel,  although
some  suggestions  have  been  made  that,  since  the  banks  have  essentially  written- 46 -
down  the  value  of their  developing  country  loans,  developing  countries  should
only  be  required  to pay  interest  on the  reduced  real  value  of the  debt.
Second,  as already  explained,  provisioning  does reduce  the likely
size  of new  money  flows  from  the  banks  to  the  highly  indebted  countries. If
these  flows  are not replaced  from  other  sources,  and if there  is no related
relief  in debt obligations,  provisioning  will have increased  the size  of ex
ante negative  net transfers.  The sign and size of net transfers  is an
important  ingredient  in  models  of debt  repudiation,  with larger  negative  net
transfers  increasing  the  incentive  to default.  If, indeed,  highly  indebted
countries  did  now  perceive  the  benefits  of  default  as ex..eeding  the  costs,  and
acted accordingly,  provisioning,  which was designed  to regularize  banks'
balance  sheets  to the existing  debt  situation,  could  in principle  make that
situation  worse. Extra  provisioning,  far  from  being  the  one-off  action  which
some bankers  present  it as, could possess  its own internal  dynamics.  A
worsening  debt  situation  brought  about  by provisioning  could  itself  result  in
additional  provisioning  and  a further  deterioration  in  the  debt  situation.
The third way in which extra commercial  bank provisioning  might
affect  the  debtor  countries  is  through  its  impact  on  debt  swap  activity. This
is not the  place  to provide  a detailed  analysis  of the  potential  effects  of
debt equity  swaps  on the  "host"  country.  21/  Clearly,  however,  such swaps
reduce  the external  debt obligations  of the debtor  country  and may in*iuce
additional  equity  investment.  If such  benefits  outweigh  the  potential  costs
associated  with exchange  rate and monetary  management,  and the result is
therefore  that  debtor  countries  derive  net benefits  from  debt  equity  swaps,
then,  anything  that encourages  swapping  will be of advantage  to the debtor
21.  See  Bird  ibid  for  a discussion  and  analysis  of  this.- 47 -
country. As discussed  above,  extra  provisioning  does  help  to weaken  one of
the  former  constraints  on debt  equity  swaps.
Provisioning  would  be of  greater  relevance  to  debtor  countries  if it
could be legitimately  interpreted  as part of a trend  towards  greater  debt
forgiveness  by the banks.  However,  as yet there  is no strong  reason  for
feeling  that  such  a trend  exists. In these  circumstances  its  adverse  effects
on  new  maney  flows  could  easily  mean  that  debtor  countries  lose  out.
(c)  For  the  official  sector
Just  as a reduced  flow  of new  money  from  the  banks  has implications
for  the debtor  countries,  it also  has implications  for  the  official  sector.
In  essence,  it  increases  the  pressures  on the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  to  play  a
larger  role  both  in  financing balance-of-payments  deficits, and  in
articulating  appropriate  adjustment  strategies  through  the  conditionality  that
both  institutions  can  bring  in  to  bear  on  debtor  nations.
More generally,  if provisioning  makes the debt problem  worse by
increasing  the incentive  for debtors  to default,  it increases  the systemic
need  for  compensating  action  to  be taken. Since  provisioning  may  be  seen  as  a
step  by  the  commercial  banks  towards extricating  themselves  from the
investment  in developing  countries  --  certainly  in the form  in  which  it has
taken  place  over  recent  years  --  it leaves  more  of a vacuum  to be filled  by
the  multilateral  agencies.  22/
This  is  certainly  a  reasonable  reflection  of  views  within  the  bankins
22.  For  a discussion  of how the banks  view  their  own future  contribution  to
financing economic development  see, Restoring  Market Access:  New
Directions in  Bank  Lending, Institute of  International  Finance,
Washington,  June 1987. The  emphasis  is  placed  on projects  and  on  backing
the  domestic  private  sector.- 48  -
community. the  unanimous  feeling  is that  the  off  I sector,  fairly  widely
defined,  should  be doing  more  to help  resolve  the  debt  problem,  not only in
making  financial  concessions  and in refurbishing  conditionality,  but  also in
terms of  orchestrating  and taking an overall lead in the approach to
international  debt.  An important  implication  of greater  provisioning  is that
this  expanded  role  becomes  more  likely.
More specifically,  and  perhaps  in  the  shorter  term,  debtor  countries
facing  greater  difficulties  in  refinancing  their  loans  from  the  private  sector
may find it progressively  more  awkward  to  meet their  outstanding  obligations
to the  multilateral  agencies  and  these  will  therefore  not be  entirely  exempt
from  the  default  concerns  of  the  private  sector.
While  the banks  are certainly  not in a position  to opt out of the
debt problem,  there  may be a case  for shifting  the balance  of significance
more towards  the official  sector. To the  extent  that provisioning  assists
such  a shift  it  could  be  of systemic  advantage.
Within the official  sector  provisioning  by commercial  banks  will
force  the regulatory  and tax  authorities  to define  their  own  attitudes  more
clearly. This  may result  in tensions  within  the  sector. Regulators  anxious
to sustain  the  security  and  stability  of the  financial  system  may  be expected
to welcome  additional  provisioning.  The  tax  authorities,  on the  other  hand,
may  not be anxious  to make  the tax  concessions  that  might  help  to encourage
provisioning.  Moreover,  the  wing  of  the  official  sector  dealing  mere  directly
with  financial  flows  to the  developing  world  may  be worried  about  the  effects
of  provisioning  on  total  flows.
In  all the above discussion  it would be a mistake to isolate
commercial  bank provisioning  as being  of the  greatest  strategic  importance.
Kany  of its  implications  are  marginal  and  are frequently  somewhat  uncertain.- 49  -
Indeed  some  commentators  have  argued  that  one  of the  central  implications  of
provisioning  is precisely  the  additional  uncertainty  it generates. In terms
of the  principal  issues  involved  in the  resolution  of the  international  debt
problem  provisioning  is  probably  of rather  limited  significance.  Perhaps  its
greater  significance  would  be if  it  reflected  an attitudinal  change  on behalf
of the banks.  But it is difficult  to be certain  about  the  extent  to which,
this  has  taken  place.  No
The  next  section  of the  report  therefore  moves  on to  examine  broader
issuea  relating  to International  debt  and  to see  where  provisioning  fits  into
such  issues.
IV.  PROVISIONING  AND  DEBT  STRATEGIES  FOR  TUB FUTURE
There  is  no shortage  of  opinion  as  to  wherein  lies  the  best  chance  of
solving  the international  debt  problem. At one end  of the spectrum  is the
line  of argumr:nt  that  market  measures  should  ba assigned  the  principal  role.
This sees  the future  as involving  the  expansion  of secondary  markets  and of
debt equity  swaps.  To the  extent  that  there  might  be official  intervention
this would focus  on capping  interest  rates.  The optimists  point  out that
debtor  countries  can  simultaneously  taken  on more  debt  and  improve  their  debt
situation  provided  they  achieve  adequate  rates  of economic  growth. Again  the
argument  is that the best chance  of securing  such growth  is to deregulate
domestic  markets  and  to  allow  the  private  sector  to  assume  greater- 50  -
significance.  23/
At the  other  end of the  spectrum  are those  who  are  more  pessimistic
about the future  and are certainly  skeptical  as to  whether  the  debt  problem
may be resolved  by relying  so heavily  on the unimpaired  wurkings  of the
market. Such  skepticism  spawns  the  view  that  the  official  sector  should  have
an  expanded  role  and  that  new  devices  and  initiatives  from  this  sector  will  be
required  if the debt problem  is to be overcome  in an efficient  fashion.
Opinions,  however,  vary  about  the  details  of the  devices  and initiatives  that
are  required. 24/
In the  context  of this  report  there  is  little  point  in  undertaking  a
full review of  the various schemes  that have been put forward in the
literature.  Instead the approach adopted here  is to  investigate  how
provisioning  might  fit  into  and  facilitate  alternative  global  debt  strategies.
In one important  respect  provisioning  by the banks  may be seen as
fitting  neatly  into  the  market-related  solution  since,  as pointed  out  earlier,
it facilitates  debt conversion.  However,  a common  criticism  of debt equity
swaps  is that they  do not generate  any significant  additional  resources,  but
merely  re-channel  investment  that  would  have  occurred  anyway. If this  is the
case,  debt  equity  swaps  emerge  as being  a better  tool for  dealing  with one
part of the  debt problem,  the  overhang  of debt,  than  with  another  part,  the
generation  of future  loans.
Some  bankers  deny that  there  will  be a strong  demand  for  new loans,
23.  For a concise  presentation  of this  point  of view see  Martin  Feldstein,
"Muddling  Through  Can  Be  Just  Fine,"  The  Economist,  June  27,  1987.
24.  For a review  of some  of these  see  Graham  Bird,  International  Financial
Policy  and Economic  Development: A Disaggregated  Approach,  Macmillan,
London,  1987.- 51  -
or argue that the loans  will only be forthcoming  if the debtor  countries
pursue  economic  policies  that  are  deemed  sensible  by the  financial  community
and if their  economic  performance  improves. Others  argue that,  while the
market  mechanism  may help  the  banks  to reduce  their  debt-related  exposure  in
developing  countries,  future  lending  will have to rely on the official
sector.  Again, as  mentioned earlier, there seems little doubt that
provisioning  will  have  a  negative  impact  on the  availability  of new  loans  from
the  banks.
Yet  bankers  themselves  remain  skeptical  of the  feasibility  of  many  of
the plans  designed  to enhance  the financial  role  of the  official  sector,  and
in  particular  of those  which  envisage  establishing  some  form  of International
Discounting  Agency  which  would  buy the banks  out  of the  developing  country
loans. 25/
More  often  than  not  bankers  emphasize  the  importance  of a leadership
role  for  the  official  sector,  in  particular,  the  World  Bank  and  IMF. Of late
they express  some concern  over what they perceive  as a weakening  in Fund
conditionality,  and  a  general lack of  stewardship  by  the  multilateral
agencies. To some  bankers  "leadership"  and  "stewardship"  do not  necessarily
involve  vast additional  amounts  of money,  but instead  involve  a  clearly
thought  out strategy,  a clear  statement  of this strategy,  and a firm but
constructive  use of conditionality. At present they see no clear and
consistent  message  coming  from  the  official  sector.
25.  Even so, provisioning  may  provide  greater  opportunity  for  converting  the
developing  country  debt  held  by the  banks  into  long-term  marketable  bonds
(or  consols)  issued  either  by the  countries,  with  external  guarantees,  or
by  an International  agency. Conventionally  such  proposals  have  floundered
on the  assumption  that  banks  would  not  be  prepared  to  take  losses  on their
Third  World  debt  in exchange  for  less  risk  in  the  form  of  guarantees,  but
greater  provisioning  calls  this  assumption  into  question.- 52  -
In this environment  it may be worth  considering  other,  apparently
less  ambitious  proposals  for  setting  up some  type  of international  bankruptcy
court,  called,  by one of its  proposers,  the International  Debt  Restructuring
Agency  (IDRA). 26/ This  agency  might  be  a joint  subsidiary  of the  World  Bank
and  the IMF and would aim towards  providing  a  setting  within which a
negotiated  resolution  of debt  service  difficulties  could  be  achieved. Debtor
countries  feeling  unable  to  meet  their  debt  obligations  would  have the  chance
to apply to IDRA,  which  would then bring  together  all interested  parties.
Within  this  framework,  creditors  might  agree  to  offer  the  debtor  some  form  of
relief. But,  in return  for  this,  the  debtor  would  have  to  accept  a degree  of
policy  conditionality  to be determined  by the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  IDRA
would  then  monitor  the  agreement  drawing  on the  expertise  of its  subsidiaries,
with  the  Mope of seeing  the  debtor  country  restored  to  creditworthiness.
The advantages  of this  scheme  are, first,  that it would  enable  the
officialsector to provide  the leadership  that  many are  calling  for.  Yet,
second,  itftwould  not  require  significant  amounts  of  extra  finance  which  are
unlikely  to  be  available.  Essentially  there  would  just  be  the  administrative
costs  of.,-operating  the  scheme.  Third,  it would  enable  both  official  and
private  4reditors  to come together  and hopefully  agree on an appropriate
distribution  of debt relief.  Fourth, it would enable a  cohesive and
consistent  debt relief  and policy  conditionality  package  to be assembled.
The  official  sector  would  thereby  be  providing  the  necessary  input  in terms  of
the  adjustment  incentive.  Fifth,  and  as  part  of  such  an  adjustment  input,  the
scheme  w;ould  encourage  closer  co-operation  between  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bapk
26.  See  Benjamin  J.  Cohen,  "Needed:  An  International  Chapter  11,"  New York
Times,  August  18,  1987,  p.  A23.- 53  -
in the  design  of structural  adjustment  programs. Finally,  the  inclusion  of
conditionality,  as  well  as the  structured  way  in  which  applications  for  relief
would  be handled,  would  help  to  deal  with  a  "moral  hazard"  issue,  namely  that
debt relief  to one  country  would  result  in unmanageable  pressures  from  other
countries  to  receive  similar  relief.
The  proposal  has  the  more  general  advantage  of  offering  an inducement
to  both  creditors  and  debtors  alike. To creditors,  there  is  the  reduced  risk
of  debtor  default  and the  attraction  that  debtor  countries  will  be encouraged
to pursue  policies  designed  to enhance  their future  ability  to pay.  To
debtors, there  is  the  attraction  of  receiving relief of  their  debt
obligations,  the absence  of which  might force them to pursue  a range of
relatively  more unpalatable  measures. Moreover,  both official  and private
creditors  would be brought  together  to negotiate  a common  approz&ch.  This
could  help  overcome  the  present  position  where  there  are  significant  problems
of perception. The banks  feel  that  first,  undue  pressure  has  been put  upon
them to act  as a lender  of last  resort,  second,  they  have  been inslifficiently
consulted  in  the  design  of  "rescue  packages",  and  third,  many  of-  the  resources
they  'have  put  in have,  in  effect,  been  used  to  bale  out  the  offieial  sector.
Meanwhile  elements  of the official  sector  feel  that  the  banks'.hat%  been  too
reluctant  to accept  both their part in causing  the debt problem  and, in
relation  to  this,  an adequate  share  of  the  adjustment  burden.
0  Of course  proposals  of  the  kind  outlined  above  would  have  very  little
chance  of success  if the private  banks  were  unwilling  to offer  any extended
form  of relief  to debtors. However,  in this  context,  and  as  noted  earlier  in
this report,  the  act of provisioniLng  may well imply  that  the banks  are now
more  prepared  to accede  to  a loss  than  they  were  before. They  may  perceive  a
new negotiating  framework  as offering  the best chance  of minimizing  these- 54  -
losses. Moreover,  they  may  be prepared,  %n  effect,  to pay  something  for  the
greater  leadership  and refurbished  conditionality  that they  deem  appropriate
from  the  official  sector.
Although the proposal  for a  debt restructuring  agency primarily
focuses  on the problem  of the  debt  overhang,  it  could  also  have  implications
for  the  future  flow  of  funds  to  developing  countries.  Not  least,  the  sight  of
debt difficulties  being  handled  in a more structured  and organized  fashion
could  do little  other  than  help  the  restoration  of  creditworthiness;  something
which, as  outlined  above, would also be helped by the appropriate  and
effective  use  of conditionality.  Furthermore,  the  bring  together  of official
agencies  and the private  banks  under  the  umbrella  of such  an agency  could
assist  the  expansion  of  co-financing.  27/
If  the banks and  the official  sector did concede to granting
additional  debt relief  under  the  auspices  of a new  negotiating  framework,  a
question  to be resolved  would  relate  to the form that this relief  should
take.  Fairly  clearly  its  purpose  would  be to reduce  debt-related  claims  on
debtor  countries'  foreign  exchange  and  the  end  result  would  therefore  have  to
lower  current  debt  service  payments.  Such  an  objective  may  be  achieved  either
by reducing  payments  of principal  or of interest. In the past banks  have
favored the rescheduling  of principal  and the continuation  of  interest
payments. But  given  that  some  banks  are  encouraging  the  official  sector  to
provide  a  mechanism  for  capping  interest  rates,  they  might  be  prepared  to
27.  For  a  more  fully  developed  analysis  of the  scope  for  expanded  co-financing
see,  Craham  Bird,  Developing  Country  Borrowing  from  Private  Markets: Key
Aspects  and  Prospects  for  the  Future,  Report  for  the  International  Finance
Division  of the  World  Bank,  June  198SM- 55  -
accept  greater  rate  capitalization  themselves.  28/  29/  Indeed,  in one  sense,
the provision  of new money  has represented  a form  of capitalization.  With
less  new money  being  made available  in the  future,  the banks  might  be more
prepared  to redefine  the  way  in  which  capitalization  takes  place  by  attaching
it  to  old  loans. 301
A sensitive  problem  will  remain  that  of the  appropriate  distribution
of relief  between  the  private  and official  sectors,  and,  indeed,  within  the
official sector.  Certainly bankers believe that they have frequently
demonstrated  more flexibility  in attempting  to alleviate the  financing
problems  of  debtor  countries  than  has  the  Paris  Club  or to  a lesser  extent  the
World  Bank and IMF.  They will therefore  not accept  a set  of arrangements
which  they  see  as  offering  unilateral  relief  on  their  side;  hence  the  need  for
discussion  and  negotiation.
Pinaiiy,  it  neces  Lo  be  recognized  LiiaL  .. ie  eaL.e.t  ad  form.  of rlief
may  need  to  vary  between  debtors.  Some  of  the  poorest  ccountries  of Africa  and
Asia may, for  example,  warrant  relief  with  a higher  grant  element  than  that
given  to Latin  American  developing  countries.  At the  same  time  a reasonably
clear rationale  for such differences  needs to be established.  Without
necessarily  believing  that  a formula  has  to be rigidly  applied,  debtors  need
to  be able  to identify,  a uniformity  in treatment  according  to  an  established
set  of criteria. Discussion  of these  criteria  has,  however,  been  defined  to
28.  See, for example,  the Annual  Report  of Deutsche  Bank, 1986, for the
advocacy  of  an  "interest  subsidization  fund."
29.  However,  for a critical  review  of proposals  to set  up an Interest  Rate
Compensation  Facility  within  the  IMP,  see  Graham  Bird,  "Interest  Rates  and
Debt: Would  A Cap  Pit?" World  Development  (forthcoming).
30.  It is interesting  in this  context  that  while  some  commentators  have seen
"exit bonds" as a genuine  attempt  to allow small  banks to extricate
themselves  from  lending  to the  Third  World,  others  see  the  punitive  rates
of  return  on such  bonds  as  effectively  encouraging  them  to  stay  in.- 56  -
lie  beyond  the  scope  of this  report.
Attempts  to help resolve  the  debt problem  along  the lines  outlined
above should  not be regarded  as exclusive,  but merely  as one component  of
armory  of policies. Banks  will no doubt  continue  to develop  new items  to
include on  their "menu of choice".  At  the same time, proposals  for
international  insurance  schemes  based  on the official  sector  but privately
financed  as well  as for  selective  allocations  of Special  Drawing  Rights  seem
worthy  of further  consideration.  31/  Similarly,  proposals  for liberalizing
the  Compensatory  Financing  Facility  within  the  IMF,  as  well  as the  setting  up
an  equivalent  Interert  P.ate  Compensation  Facility (IRCF) could make  a
contribution.  32/  The debt problem  is unlikely  to be resolved  by one
particular  policy,  but  rather  by a broad  strategy  which  encompasses  a  number
of elements. 33/  The  challenge  is to  ensure  that  there  are  enough  elements
au place  -and Lh&L they are consisLent  with one another  and mutually  re-
enforcing.  b i
There  can  be little  doubt  that,  while  the  banks  have  a role  to play
in this strategy,  it is not their  responsibility  to devise  and orchestrate
S
it.  Given such a  supporting  role, the significance  of commercial  bank
provisioning  to the strategy  has to be put in proper  perspective.  Although
not  without  importance,  its  importance  should  not  be  exaggerated.
31.  See for example,  Graham  Bird,  Developing  Country  Borrowing  from  Private
Markets ...  op cit, and "A Strategy  for Global Debt,"  Millennium:
Journal  of  International  Studies  (forthcoming).
32.  For  a discussion  of potential  reforms  to the  CFF see  Bird,  International
Financial  Policy  and  Economic  Development,  op cit,  and  footnote  28  above.
33.  The significance  of conditionality  should  be underlined. Resolution  of
the global  debt  problem  depends  crucially  on the pursuit  of appropriate
policies  in the  debtor  countries  themselves.57
Table  1: EXPOSUiRE  OF  NAJOR  CONTfRIES  DAWNKS  TO  SEPARATE  LATIN  AMERICAN  STATES
End-1986
d-_ided  S million
bank
exposure  Italy  USA  UK  Japan  Canada  France  Germany Switzerland
billion  (I)  (2)  (I  )  (I1)  (2)  (2)  (2)  (I )  (I  )
26.6  Argentina  704  9,046  3,677  4,300  1,438  1,900  3,266  1,280
0.7  q  Bolivia  1  89  94  - 84  100  103  15
77.9  Brazil  439  23,624  9,140  8,200  5,559  8,400  6,328  1,710
13.4  Chile  173  6,254  2,178  1,400  989  600  1,024  545
6.9  Colombia  16  2,155  756  1,000  492  600  507  150
5.0  0  Ecuador  67  2,017  760  700  288  200  331  85
71.8  Moxico  1,365  23,545  8,669  10,000  5,481  5,500  3,834  1,750
5.5  I  Peru  70  1,158  649  400  147  700  498  205
2.0  Uruguay  8  889  386  80  84  100  85  95
25.1  Venezuela  496  8,733  2,690  3,650  2,057  2  500  2,107  655
34.9  3,339  77,510  28,999  29,730  16,619  20,600  18,Q83  6,490
Central  Bink  statistics.
EstImates  by  the International  Bank  Credit  Analysis  Group  (IBCA),  London.
n:  .58
Table  2:  BANK3  RESERVES  AGAINST  DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  LOANS, 1986




Germany  35-70  (40)*
Japan  5
Netherlands  24-26
Spain  7-68  (1O)*
Sweden  35-80  (50)*
Switzerland  30-60  (40)*
United Kingdom . 6-10
United  States  5
F  figures  in  brackets  given  an  approximate  average  where  there
Source:  International  Bank  Credit  Analysis  Group  (IBCA),  London.Table  1:  YFAR END-1'#R6 DATA
_________  S  !  Ii  I_  8  I  Oe101NU  ,|SQ  |i
CItICORP  15,590  196.124  130,904  7,695  9,(160  1,698  3,194  1,0S8  3.92  4.62  50.0  1.30  172
SANKAMERICA  0)RP  10,000  104,169  73,955  3,329  4,(I|83  2,172  4,031  (518)  3.20  3.68  53.9  2.94  248
MANUFACTURERS  HANOVER  6,400  74,397  56,273  .3,123  3,i'66  1,006  2,135  411  4.20  5.06  47.2  1.79  223
CHASE  HANHATTANI  6,100  94,766  66,200  4,260  4,1182  1,064  1,940  585  4.52  5.I5  514.6 1.61  176
J  P MORGAN  NA  76,039  34,693  4,680  5,130  910  633  673  6.42  6.75 143.6  2.62  NA
CIIFMICAL  NEW  YORF  5,900  60,564  39,425  2,610  3,120  666  1,349  402  4.64  5.15  49.5  1.69  169
ESMIERS  tRUST  4,000  56,419  29,201  2,721  2,;'21  590  679  426  4.62  4.62  67.1  2.02  147
FIRST CHICACO  2,600  39,141  25,410  2,022  2,1147  S85  819  276  5.lt  6.00  11.4  2.30  119
SECIIRITt PACIFIC  1,650  62,606  *4,343  2,5J5  2,1117S  757  1,196  386 4.11  4.S9  63.2  1.71  64
VEIL.S  FARGO  & CO  1,900  44,S571  36,771  1,936  2,343  734  9709  274  4.35  5.26  7S.7  2.00  61
FIRSt  INTERSTATE  l.hO0  55,421  34,523  2,757  2,1t59  535  1,021  316 4.97 4.98  52.6  1.55  58
Snurce:  Iviternaetonel  Dank Credit  Analysis  Croup  (IBGA),  London.Table  4:  EFFECT  OF A00ITIOiAL  M14P1Si0NS  FOR  DEVELOPING  CoWTRY  DEBT
1-  ESERVES  Non-
Reserves/  Devloping
Developing  Second  ilnvelop-  Developing  Country  Comon  Total
Country  Additional  Quarter  1967  Ing  Rrserves/  Country  Reserves/  Equity/  Equlty/
Exposure  Provision  Earnings  Earnings  Total  iountry  Other  Loans  Exposure  NPLs  Assets  Assets
S  S  S  S  S
CITlOWP  15,590  3000  (2,500)  (1,000)  4,900  3,500  1,400  3.7  22.5  41.2  3.30  4.01
NK  AiERICA COW.  10,000  1,100  (1,000)  (750)  3,300  10  1,500  4.5  18.0  37.2  2.U  3.13
iFACTtiERS  iANDVER  8,400  1,700  (1,400)  (1,050)  2,700  1,850  850  4.8  22.0  39.8  2.74  3.62
CHASE  MNAITTAN  86700  1,600  (1,400)  (850)  2,700  2,000  700  4.1  23.0  36.1  3.45  4.09
J.  P.  iAN  *
CHEICAL NEW  YOW  5,900  1,100  (1,100)  (710)  2,074  1,300  694  4.1  24.8  47.9  3.27  3.79
iANERS  TRUIST  4,000  ;C)  (570)  (175)  1,300  1  ,00  300  4.5  25.0  34.1  4.36  4.36
FIAST CHICAGO  2,600  SW  (700)  (435)  1,370  935  435  5.4  33.4  53.1  3.89  4.74
SECURITY  PACIFIC  1,850  500  (175)  150  1,300  650  650  2.9  35.1  54.3  4.19  4.68
WELLS  FARO  & OD  I,900
FIRST  INTERSTATE  1 600  750  (455)  (200)  1,200  530  670  3.5  33.1  65.6  4.45  4.46
Nute:  ei  Nther  of  those  banks  had announced a  resrve  Increas  at  the  time  this  table  was completed,  though  they  did  subsequently.
Several  of  the  banks stated  that  their  developing  country  reserves  were 25  peri*nt  of  developing  country  exposure,  but  this  was  accomplished  by  adding  back
the  "Allocated  Transfer  Risk"  to  reserves.  Our  table  does  not  aod  back  this  rioserve  and thus  the  ratios  are  slightly  lower.
Bank Aerica Indicated  that  It.  reserve  was for  25  percent  of  Its  S10 billion  developing  country  exposure,  but  that  ratio  Is  achieved  only  after  adding  back
about  5600 million  of  "Allocated  Transfer  Risk"  reserves  and prior  charg-oftfs  of  developing  country  loans.
The non-performing  loan  totals  are  for  year-end  1986 and thus  do  not  include  tilie  Brazilian  loans  placed  on  nonaccrual  status  In  the first  quarter.
The adjusted  equity  to  assets  ratios  assume that  the  holding  companies  pay  the  sam  dividends  In  1967 as  In  1986 and that  asset  totals  at yeoar-nd  1987 aro
the  sas  as  at  year-end  1966.
Adjustmnts  have  been  made In  the  data  for  Chemical  to  reflect  the  acquisition  of  Texas  Comerce In  May 1967.
Source:  International  Bank Credit  Analysis  Group  (ISCA),  London.Tablis 5:  EFFECTS  0F  IKWASED RESERVES  FOR  KEVELOPINS  001.ltR  LOAN
EXPSURS FOR  us GIiS
SAINUM  S9661 EFFECTS
ESTIOalED  I
0F FiWnY  CAPITAl
DATE  OF  FAD  FORM  MSERVE  00VERM OF:  AVG..  E9uiTY1AvG.  LOANS  AVG.  EQUITY/AVG.  ASSETS PRoMPT  CAPITALi'ASSETS 0ieRfO SED fO  EUl)
STOOR  FESEAVE  LUC  (a)  TOTAL  lb)  TOTAL  (C)  M.P.  LOANS  id)  - -
a0MPANT  kw  SYlgo  ~AWTIOs  EXFO  LON  M.P.  LOANS 253  1DC  EW.  91167  929117E  3  CHA1*1  91187  92887E  0WJMGE  91'S?  902'S  304mG  91187  92a87E
Citicorp  005  19 NaY  67  253  3.01831  76.1$  66.9  7.1  S.2"  -26.63  4.893  3.423  -27.13  7.03  ?.I%  0.93  673  403
Narniuast  MN  26  may  87  343  4.013  98.53  121.43  10.2  9.03  -12.23  6.4103 5.010  I1.9"  8.03  8.93  1.53  753  853
Chao"  of  27 Nay 87  263  4.053  58.53  69.33  7.53  5.43  -28.33  5.113  3.6?3  28.23  6.91  6.93  0.43  743  53m0
Security  Paciflc  SPC  Of  Jun  87  363  2.033  71.03  77.03  10.43  10.03  -3.63  4.64S  4.373  -5.9"  6.431  7.43  15.13  723  59I-
Rainier  Ram  02  Jun  87  333  2.073  96.13  83.41  9.23  9.03  -3.13  6.433 6.163  -4.23  7.33  7.53  2.93  ll3  W23
Mbercnt  Ile  Sancop  NIIC  02 Jun 6?  293  3.19%  83.63  94.03  10.43  9.73  -7.03  7.1031  6.613  -6.93  1.03  0.53  6.03  693  703
Narcanla National  NM  02  Jun  8?  353  2.6103  160.33  159.23  13.53  12.43%  -4.53  7.693 7.34S  -4.53  8.5  8.91  4.33  663  833
eSak  of  Oaton  US  03  Jun 87  363  3.073  86.43  80.43  7.93  7.53  -4.63  5.733 5.473  -4.53  7.43  7.93  7.23  78  693
Sankt  of  tarica  SAC  -08  Jun 87  19"  4.013  60.23  63.63  5.73  4.23  -25.63  4.003 2.993 -25.2%  7.33  7.43  1.13  553  403
Chamical  Na.  York  Corp  04.  II  Jun 87  253  4.093  88.83  75.63  8.13  5.93  -26.93  5.193  3.013  -26.53  7.33  7.13  -2.231  713  543
First  Interstate  Bancorp  I  It  Jun 87  333  3.703  85.53  66.83  8.33  6.91  -16.93  5.243 4.M9  -16.63  6.93% 7.73  10.63  763  573
First  Chicag  FiD  12 JUN  87  303  5.523  105.73  90.71  9.53  6.73  29.63  5.733 3.993 -30.43  8.33  8.23  0.83  693  493
Shaibrut  Corp  9M5S  12  Jun  87I  333  1.963  122.23  104.83  9.03  9.43  -4.5  6.513 6.213  -4.43  7.53  7.43  -1.33  873  843
SW  ancorp  NMl  IS  Jun  87  303  I.803  171.43  133.23  10.43  10.53  I.2  5.603 5.073  1.13  6.93  7.03  1.53  643  843
Mellon  Sank  Cor  OIL  15 Jun 87?  273  4.443  69.43  71.13  8.53  6.231  -26.43  5.673 4.223 -25.63  7.23  7.03  -3.23  783  603
Manufacturers  HeNwoers  wet  16  Jun 87  22  4.893  77.43  71.33  6.03  4.33  -37.13  4.933 3.003 -37.53  7.33  7.531  3.2%  8G3  4131
Centerre  Sencwor  CTSC  16  Jun 87  353  2.643  109.03  91.43  11.93  11.63  -2.13  6.303  6.1 ?S  -2.11  7.23  7.5S  3.63  873  82s
Eanhas  Trust  N.V.  Corp.  ST  16  Jun  87  253  4.953  101.63  76.63  10.33  8.13  -21.23  4.753 3.763 -20.731  6.91  6.91%  0.13  693  553
Source:  Keef  . Buyette end Mends  loc..  Bamscan.  Na.  York.
a)  Total ICC  iess  resrv,  al  loctation  as  a  S  of LOC  axpoae.r
b) Overal  I  reseve  as  a  S of  total  loans
c)  OvrallI  resarve  n  ot3 of  total  m  pon-eforamlg  loans  (IncludIng  LOC  ncon-erformleg  loans).
4)  Overall  reserve  as a  3  of ca-peforalag  loans  (auciudng  LOC  potion)  Plus  253  of  LOC  expoar.TabDl 6:  EFFECTS  OF  EXTRA W1iSlCrNS  ON  UNilED  KINGl  BANKS
(Al  iIn  billions  9  USSI *  0.61)
-- Asssing  tax  relief  of  35-----  -- smlng  no tax  relief---
Oaeloplag  Extra  PrM-tax  If6  1966  Assets  Equity  I96  Equity  Not
Country  Prov:  1986  Profit  1986  Extra  Prov  Equity  Not of  Bat  of  Equity  Not  of  Full
Exposure  Exlsting  Increase  Pro-tax after  1966  1966  Equity/ Bat  of  tat  of  Full  oBt  Prow  of  Full  Full  Extra
Books  lacl  SA  sasrve  to  30S  Profit  Prov  Equity  Assets  Assets  Tix  Ral  of  IBt  Prow  Extra  Prow  Assets  Extr Prov  w  Prow/Assets
Berlass  3.2  !  7.0  0.730  0.096  0.165  3.826  76.169  5.02  0.474  3.352  75.439  4.44  3.096  4.10
Lloyds  3.60  5.0  0.900  0.700  -0.200  2.755  47.829  5.76  0.585  2.170  46.929  4.62  1.655  3.9  5I
MIdl ad  4.3  7.0*  0.962  0.434  -0.54f  2.111  53.169  3.97  0.636  1.473  52.161  2.12  1.129  2.16
Net.  vast  2.0  I  3.2  0.466  1.053  0.567  4.702  63.325  5.6!  0.303  4.399  82.059  5.31  4.236  5.11
Dyal Bank  of  Scotland  0.2  9.0  0.036  0.185  0.147  0.964  16.507  5.61  9.025  0.99  16.559  5.67  0.926  5.59
Bates:  a  Estlstad
1.  Icludes  South Africa  (cross-border),  which at  nd-1906 exchangp  rates  was 726  million.
Rate of  prowlsians:  30 pWrcnt
Tea relfIf  rate:  35 perenat63
Table  72  COMMERCIAL  BNiKS PROVISIONS  AGAINST  DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  LOANS
(khtimated  July  1987)
Creditor  Country  Reserves
(US$ billion)
United  States
15  Largest  Banks  26.0
Other  Regional  Banks  4.0
Japan
22  Largest  Banks  1.5







Source: World  Bank (updated).64
Table  8S  MARKET  PRICES  OF DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  DEBT
(selected  countries)
October  October  April  March
1985  1986  1987  1988
Brazil  78  76  64  48
Mexico  80  e  57  59  49
Argentina  65  66  60  29
Venezuela  82  74  74  54
Chile  69  68  70  58
Peru  33  20  18  7
Source: International  Bank  Credit  Analysis  Group  (IBCA),  London  and
Salomon  Brothers  Inc,  New  York.65
Table  9:  DEBT  INDICATORS  FOR AND  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  OF
HIGHLY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986
Debt  Service
Ratio  (percent)  1/  18.1  20.0  24.9  24.7  23.1  26.1  29.0
Interest  to  Exports
Ratio  (percent)  8.8  10.3  14.3  15.0  15.0  17.1  18.7
Net  Transfer
(US$  billion)  8.8  18.4  3.8  -7.4  -17.5  -26.1  -24.9
GNP
(US$  billion)  858.7  941.0  841.3  726.5  746.3  750.3  776.5
Exports
(US$  billion)  163.0  167.1  145.2  138.1  153.7  149.1  132.3
Imports
(US$  billion)  196.1  222.8  203.0  157.4  158.4  155.8  150.4
1/ Debt  Service  relative  to  exporl:s  of  goods  and  services.
Source: World  Debt  Tables,  1987-83  edition,  World  Bank  1988.TKE  10:  AIEt  EFFECTS  OF WBA  FWVISIONISS
(hu  is.  lo7)
EANINGS  PEKR  Si  O  VALIE  KR  9  STOCK  FRI(2
sTOCK  S aCHR  WEM  END  s  0  *FORE  _E
CaW  sueom  1906  IsWE  lseeE  87E/66  6  IN&  191117E  IO11E  lE/5  EMAI  AWITION  lIS07  -
CIticorp ti  67.13  (67.25)  612.60  -2025  775  855.83  645.68  655.70  -17.65  -o.S  60.43  662.03  23.701
brthust  MOE  3.16  (1.25)  6.00  -13S5  05  3.42  3S.37  39.57  -7."  3.05  36.13  44.20  13.105
Chow  Of  6.50  (1O0.o)  10.00  -250  5n4  52.95  40.49  46.35  23.55  4.75  37.25  44.124  10.465
Scurity  Pacfic  4SPC  *.6  1.45  5.90  -705  211  35.25  32.90  37.00  -1.15  11.3s  3e.30  42.000  9.4,5
RAlulr  A  R  3.41  1.75  N.A.  -4  --  26.05  27.44  N.A.  2.  --  47.755  52.500  9.ff5
larcatile  Beworp  NIAC  3.57  0.1s  4.00  -96%  125  29.50  20.33  3O.9  -4.2  4.65  24.50  26.7M  9.105
Sarcasis  National  NM  2.4s  1.10  3.05  -555  245  21.56  21.90  24.5S  I."  U2."  26.75  26.750  0.005
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